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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW 
AND PRESERVATION 
issue in i MM III ' ,i inn n pn-M'iiiul li> i I M 111 n he pleaded |'iiilh in the 
Mm i ,IN ('itv Justice Court. The justice court judge sentenced Mr. Lucero to an actual 
and suspended jail sentence. Did Mr Lucero make a constitutionally valid waiver of his 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel prior to picauing gt. 
Preservation. Mr. Lucero preserved this issue in the post-conviction proceedings. 
R. 1-2, 26-27, 36-44, 54-57, 116:5-48. He argued that he was sentenced to jail and 
suspended jail in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
Argersinger v. Hamlin. 407 U.S. 25, 33 (1972), and Alabama v. Shelton. 535 U.S. 654, 
122 S.Ct. 1764 (2002), and asked that the remaining suspended jail sentence be vacated. 
R.27. 
Standard of Review. The issue of whether a criminal defendant knowingly and 
voluntarily waived his right to counsel is a mixed question of law and fact. State v. 
Heaton, 958 P.2d 911, 914 (Utah 1998); a copy ofHeaton is in Addendum B. The trial 
court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error and the legal conclusion as to 
whether the defendant made a constitutionally adequate waiver of the right to counsel is 
reviewed for correctness. State v. Vancleave. 2001 UT App 228, [^5, 29 P.3d 680. 
TEXT OF RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Mr. Lucero, represented by the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association (MLDAM), 
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filed a petition for post-conviction relief in Third District Court on August 1, 2002. 
R. 1-2. That petition claimed that Mr. Lucero was sentenced to an actual and suspended 
jail sentence in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and 
named Sheriff Aaron Kennard, Chief Paul Cunningham, the Salt Lake County Jail, and 
Murray City Justice Court as respondents. R. 1-2. 
A Salt Lake County Deputy District Attorney appeared on behalf of Sheriff 
Kennard, Chief Cunningham and the Salt Lake County Jail, and filed an answer on 
August 7,2002. R. 5-6. That answer acknowledged receipt of the petition and that at 
the time the petition was filed, Appellant was incarcerated. R. 5-6. The answer also 
indicated that those three parties were "without knowledge with respect to the allegations 
set forth in the petition" and would "immediately and faithfully comply and implement 
any order issued by the Court in this matter." R. 6. 
The Murray City Attorney's office initially appeared on behalf of Murray City 
Justice Court and moved to dismiss the petition. R. 9-14. Mr. Lucero responded to 
Murray City Justice Court's motion to dismiss. R. 36-44. Murray City Justice Court 
filed a supplemental memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss on August 21, 
2002. R. 71-76. Private counsel entered an appearance for Murray City Justice Court on 
September 9, 2002. R. 94. On September 16, 2002, Third District Court Judge Glenn 
Iwasaki held a hearing on the petition. R. 98-99. The district court concluded that 
Mr. Lucero had waived his right to counsel and dismissed the petition. On October 25, 
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2002, findings, conclusions and order were entered. R. 100-102; s.ee_ Addendum A. 
Mr. Lucero filed a notice of appeal on November 18, 2002. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. Facts in the Justice Court Docket 
Murray City charged Mr. Lucero with driving under the influence of alcohol 
("Dill"), a class B misdemeanor, and improper usage of lanes, a class C misdemeanor, 
alleging that the crimes occurred on March 17,2001. R. 28; see. Addendum C containing 
Murray Municipal Court docket (R. 28-33). The charges were filed in Murray City 
Justice Court. R. 28. 
Mr. Lucero was arraigned in Murray City Justice Court on June 14, 2001. R. 29. 
The minute entry in the docket for that date states, M[a]dvised of rights and penalties." 
R. 29. A pretrial conference was scheduled for July 20, 2001. R. 29. 
The minute entry in the docket for July 20, 2001 indicates that Mr. Lucero made a 
motion to continue the pretrial conference and the motion was granted. R. 30. The 
minute entry indicates further, ff[r]eason for continuance: Will look into retaining private 
counsel." R. 30. The pretrial conference was continued until October 26, 2001. R. 30. 
The entry for October 26,2001 shows that the pretrial conference was again 
continued at the defendant's request. R. 30. The reason for the continuance was again 
"[Retaining private counsel." R. 30. The pretrial conference was rescheduled for 
January 2, 2002. R. 30. 
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Although the pretrial conference was continued twice so that Mr. Lucero could 
retain counsel, nothing in the docket indicates that the judge considered whether 
Mr. Lucero was indigent or conducted a colloquy to determine whether Mr. Lucero 
waived counsel prior to the plea hearing. Moreover, the docket shows that after twice 
continuing the pretrial conference to retain counsel, Mr. Lucero telephoned the clerk and 
said that he would not have a trial and instead would just pay the fine, and would inform 
the prosecutor of his decision. R. 31. This notation shows Mr. Lucero's complete lack 
of understanding of the process and potential sentence he faced, while also suggesting 
that he was unable to retain counsel. See. R. 116:19, 31. 
At the January 2, 2002 pretrial conference, the justice court set the matter for a 
bench trial on April 29, 2002. R. 31. Mr. Lucero appeared pro se on April 29, 2002 and 
pleaded guilty to the charge of driving under the influence of alcohol; the charge of 
improper usage of lanes was dismissed. R. 31. The docket entry for the plea hearing 
states in its entirety: 
The Information is read. 
Court advises defendant of rights and penalties. 
A pre-sentence investigation was ordered. 
The Judge orders Intermountain Substance Abuse to prepare a Pre-sentence 
report. 
TRIAL 
Case has been resolved. Deft pled guilty to count I. Upon motion from the 
city court orders count II dismissed. 
R.31. 
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On June 4, 2002, the justice court judge imposed sentence. R. 32. The docket 
entry indicates that the judge sentenced Mr. Lucero forthwith to a term of 180 days in jail 
and required that Mr. Lucero actually serve those 180 days in jail. R. 32. In addition to 
imposing the maximum jail term, the justice court judge also imposed a fine of $1850.00 
with a surcharge of $855.41, required that the fine be paid by September 5, 2002, and 
placed Mr. Lucero on probation for eighteen months. R. 32-33. After the petition for 
post-conviction relief was filed, the Murray City Justice Court judge held a review, 
released Mr. Lucero, suspended the remainder of the jail sentence, and placed 
Mr. Lucero on probation. R. 116:5. Mr. Lucero had served 98 days of the 180 day jail 
sentence when he was released; a suspended jail sentence of 82 days remains in place. 
R. 116:5. 
The justice court judge made a finding at sentencing that Mr. Lucero was 
indigent. R. 33. Following the terms of probation, the minute entry for sentencing 
states, "(court finds def. Impecunious)." R. 33. 
2. Evidence Submitted During Post-conviction Proceeding 
Gwen Kittel, an in-court clerk in the Murray Justice Court, submitted an affidavit 
as part of the post-conviction proceedings. R. 77-78. A copy of that affidavit is in 
Addendum D. That affidavit indicates that "prior to every arraignment, Judge Ferrero 
confirms that each defendant watched the 'Rights of Criminal Defendants' video 
narrated by [former] Judge Hutchings." R. 77. A transcript of the Hutchings videotape 
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is in Addendum E. According to Ms. Kittel, at the arraignment, Judge Ferrero also 
explains a defendant's rights and "orally advises each defendant of their rights, including 
their right to be represented by an attorney before he asks the defendant how they wish to 
plead." R. 77. The clerk also had the "convincing belief that at the arraignment, "Judge 
Ferrero informed Mr. Lucero of his constitutional rights, including his right to be 
represented by an attorney and that if he could not afford to hire his own attorney, that 
one would be appointed for him free of charge." R. 78. 
Counsel for the justice court proffered that the judge, who has taken hundreds of 
pleas, could remember Mr. Lucero but could not remember specifically what had 
occurred at the plea hearing. R. 116:16. Counsel proffered further that the judge could 
testify about his usual procedure: 
Counsel for the justice court: He can testify about his usual procedure. 
And generally, it's this: He has them sign the waiver and then says 
to them, now that you've signed these things and waived your rights, I need 
to satisfy my mind that you're doing this freely and voluntarily and you 
understand the consequences of it and he goes through those things one by 
one. And of course, that is in the file. 
He goes through the elements of the offense. He goes through the 
possible sentences. He tells them that - - about each of the rights they're 
waiving and in this case, in particular, one of those rights as you can see, is 
the right to be represented by counsel. 
Now, there's some - - in the petition, there is memorandum, she 
makes - - she says it's a little unclear as to whether he really has a right or 
whether he doesn't. I asked Judge Ferrero about that and he says, well, in 
fact, it - - the way it's stated is exactly correct. That is to say, if a - - if - -
you 're not always afforded an attorney because you can't afford one. 
I mean, many of us, if we were charged with a serious crime probably 
couldn 7 afford an attorney. 
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R. 116:16-17 (emphasis added). According to this proffer, the justice court judge went 
through the rights as listed in the form, including the depiction of the right to 
court-appointed counsel suggesting that such right does not exist in all cases where the 
defendant cannot afford to retain counsel. R. 116:16-17. Counsel further proffered that 
the judge would testify regarding his usual practice as follows: 
I-I think Judge Ferrero would testify that he goes through that [plea 
affidavit] with him, he helps him understand that he does have a right to an 
attorney, that if he can't afford one, one will be appointed. That's in 
addition to what he's already seen on the - - on the videotape. 
And then when he is through asking him all those questions, if he's 
satisfied that it's free - - done freely and voluntarily and knowingly and that 
he's not under the influence of substances or whatever, then he signs the 
thing and that his signature is certification of that. 
R. 116:17; see R. 116:16-18 in Addendum F. 
A second affidavit signed by Kaylynn Olsen, an in-court clerk, was also submitted 
by the justice court in the post-conviction proceedings. R. 85-86; see_ Addendum G. It 
claims that "prior to accepting any guilty plea, Judge Ferrero orally advises each 
defendant of their rights, including their right to be represented by an attorney." R. 85. 
This clerk had a "convincing belief that "prior to accepting Mr. Lucero's guilty plea, 
Judge Ferrero orally informed Mr. Lucero of his constitutional rights, including the right 
to be represented by an attorney and that if he could not afford to hire his own attorney, 
that one would be appointed for him free of charge if he qualified based on his income." 
R. 86. 
Kaylynn Olsen also indicated in her affidavit that Mr. Lucero had executed "a 
8 
written rights waiver form informing him of his right to counsel and expressing his desire 
to waive that right." R. 86. A copy of a document entitled "Driving Under the Influence 
Rights Waiver" ("plea affidavit") which was signed by Mr. Lucero was attached to 
Murray City's "Memorandum in Support of. . . Motion to Dismiss." R. 15-19. A copy 
of the plea affidavit is in Addendum H. Regarding the right to counsel, that document 
states, 
COUNSEL: I have the right to consult with and be represented by an 
attorney. If the judge were to determine that I am too poor to be able to 
hire a lawyer, then the judge could appoint one to represent me. I might 
later, if the judge determined I was able, be required to pay for the 
appointed lawyer's service to me. 
R. 15. 
While the judge and clerks could not remember the specifics of Mr. Lucero's case 
and instead talked about usual practices, Mr. Lucero did remember the specifics. 
Mr. Lucero testified that he had been trying to get an attorney for quite awhile but was 
unable to do so because he was not working. R. 116:21. He testified further that he was 
totally confused. R. 116:21. On cross-examination, Mr. Lucero testified that he had 
"pretty much" watched the Hutchings videotape, that he understood that he had the right 
to an attorney at public expense if he could not afford one, and that he told the judge he 
could not afford an attorney because he was not working. R. 116:21-22. The judge 
asked how much money he made. R. 116:22. Mr. Lucero told the judge how much 
money he received as disability payments and the judge said he could not have a lawyer 
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because he made too much money. R. 116:22.l 
Mr. Lucero's only previous involvement with the law had occurred about thirty 
years before this incident, in the 1970fs. R. 116:22. Because so much time had passed, 
Mr. Lucero did not remember whether he had been told at the hearings in the 1970fs that 
he had the right to court-appointed counsel if he could not afford to retain a lawyer. 
R. 116:23. Mr. Lucero could not recall whether he had read the plea form, but testified 
that the judge did not go over that form in any kind of detail. R. 116:23-24. Mr. Lucero 
could remember the judge asking him some questions, but the specifics of those 
questions were not delved into at the post-conviction hearing. R. 116:24. 
After Mr. Lucero testified and was subjected to cross-examination, counsel for the 
justice court proffered that the justice court judge could not remember whether he asked 
Mr. Lucero about his assets, but the judge's usual practice when a defendant asked for an 
attorney was to ask about assets and income. R. 116:25-26. 
The affidavit of impecuniosity filed along with the petition demonstrates that 
Mr. Lucero was indigent. R. 19-22; a copy of the affidavit is in Addendum I. On 
July 31, 2002, three months after he pleaded guilty, Mr. Lucero's assets included a 1978 
truck and a 1981 motorcycle which had a total value of $3500. R. 19, 22. Mr. Lucero 
had debts totaling $3500 and monthly expenses of $800. R. 20. He had no income. 
1
 At sentencing, however, the judge found that Mr. Lucero was impecunious. 
R.33. 
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R. 19, 22. He was not employed in July 2002, and his last employment had been in 
February 2002, two months prior to pleading guilty without assistance of counsel. R. 21. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies in this case where Mr. Lucero 
pleaded guilty and was sentenced to an actual and suspended jail sentence. The 
constitutional right to counsel must be "jealously protected" and cannot be waived simply 
by expressly stating that one waives his rights. Instead, in order to establish a 
constitutionally adequate waiver of the right to counsel, a trial court must (1) advise the 
defendant of the danger and disadvantages of proceeding without counsel, (2) advise the 
defendant that he has a constitutional right to self-representation as well as a right to 
counsel and court-appointed counsel if he is indigent, (3) ascertain that the defendant has 
the intelligence and capacity to understand and appreciate the consequences of 
proceedings without counsel, and (4) ascertain that the defendant understands the nature 
and elements of the charges, the possible punishments and any other facts necessary to an 
understanding of the case. 
None of the requirements for establishing a knowing and voluntary waiver were 
met in this case. While Utah case law requires that the record of a colloquy between the 
court and defendant be reviewed in order to determine whether the defendant waived 
counsel, even if the lack of a record in a non-record court were considered an 
extraordinary circumstance, review would be limited to the justice court docket and 
11 
papers filed in the justice court. The justice court docket and papers do not establish that 
the requirements for a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel were met in 
this case. Moreover, even if the testimony from court personnel presented at the post-
conviction proceeding is considered, it fails to establish a knowing and voluntary waiver 
of the right to counsel. 
There is no indication that Mr. Lucero wanted to proceed without counsel. 
Instead, the docket shows that the pretrial conference was continued twice while 
Mr. Lucero attempted to retain counsel. Mr. Lucero ultimately telephoned the court after 
the second continuance of the pretrial conference and indicated that he would just pay the 
fine. This indicates that he did not understand the potential penalties or the 
consequences he faced since a DUI conviction carries a mandatory jail sentence. 
The justice court did not advise Mr. Lucero of the dangers and disadvantages of 
proceeding without counsel. It also did not advise Mr. Lucero that he had a 
constitutional right to self-representation. Additionally, the advice regarding the right to 
counsel did not clearly and correctly inform Mr. Lucero that he had a constitutional right 
to counsel and a constitutional right to court-appointed counsel if he were indigent. 
Additionally, the justice court made no effort to ascertain that Mr. Lucero 
possessed the intelligence and capacity to understand the consequences of proceeding 
pro se. Moreover, the record demonstrates that Mr. Lucero did not understand the 
consequences since he thought he could just pay a fine for a DUI conviction. 
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The justice court also did not ascertain that Mr. Lucero understood the nature and 
elements of the charges, the possible penalties and other facts necessary for an 
understanding of the case. The plea affidavit was wholly inadequate under Rule 11, 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and due process. It failed, among other things, to 
inform Mr. Lucero that he had the right to a speedy trial by an impartial jury, that he had 
a limited right to appeal, or that he faced mandatory jail if convicted and also failed to 
give a factual basis for the plea. While Mr. Lucero is not asking to vacate his plea, the 
inadequacy of the affidavit demonstrates that Mr. Lucero did not knowingly and 
voluntarily waive counsel. 
The record does not demonstrate that Mr. Lucero knew what he was doing when 
he proceeded without counsel or that he understood the risks he was facing. While he 
did sign a plea affidavit which outlines a waiver of rights, including the right to counsel, 
case law makes it clear that an express statement that one waives counsel is not sufficient 
to establish a constitutionally adequate waiver of the right to counsel. In this case where 
the record demonstrates that a constitutionally adequate waiver of the right to counsel 
was not made, the district court erred in dismissing the petition; the suspended jail 
sentence that remains in place must be vacated. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE 
PETITION BECAUSE THE SIXTH AMENDMENT WAS VIOLATED 
WHEN THE JUSTICE COURT IMPOSED AN ACTUAL AND 
SUSPENDED JAIL SENTENCE IN THE ABSENCE OF A 
CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL. 
A. MR. LUCERO DID NOT MAKE A CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID 
WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL. 
1. The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to counsel in this case. 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, "[i]n all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to have the Assistance of 
Counsel for the defence." This amendment, applicable to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees an accused the right to counsel and requires 
appointment of counsel if the defendant is indigent. Heaton. 958 P.2d at 917 (citing inter 
alia Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-44 (1963)); Johnson v. Zerbst. 304 U.S. 
458, 462-63 (1938); State v. Wulffenstein. 733 P.2d 120, 121 (Utah 1986)); see also 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-301 (1999); Argersinger v. Hamlin . 407 U.S. 25 (1972). 
The constitutional right to counsel applies to misdemeanors as well as felonies 
whenever actual imprisonment or a suspended jail sentence is imposed. Argersinger. 407 
U.S. at 28-37; Alabama v. Shelton. 535 U.S. 654, 654 (2002). In Argersinger. the Court 
recognized the importance of the right to counsel in ensuring a fair proceeding, and held 
"that absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any 
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offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented 
by counsel at his trial." Argersinger. 407 U.S. at 31, 37. The United States Supreme 
Court recently reiterated the importance of the right to counsel, and clarified that such 
right attaches any time an actual or suspended jail sentence is imposed. See Shelton, 535 
U.S. at 654. 
Because the penalty for DUI includes a mandatory jail sentence (see. Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-6-44 (4) (Supp. 2002)), a person such as Mr. Lucero who is charged with DUI 
has a Sixth Amendment right to counsel. In cases where the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel applies, a court cannot sentence a defendant to an actual or suspended jail 
sentence unless the defendant makes a constitutionally adequate waiver of the right to 
counsel. See Argersinger. 407 U.S. at 31; Shelton. 535 U.S. at 654, 658. This is so 
regardless of whether the defendant pleads guilty or goes to trial. See Von Moltke v. 
Gillies. 332 U.S. 708, 722 (1948). In fact, M[a] waiver of the constitutional right to the 
assistance of counsel is of no less moment to an accused who must decide whether to 
plead guilty than to an accused who stands trial." IdL There is no question that 
Mr. Lucero had a Sixth Amendment right to counsel in this case where he was sentenced 
to an actual and suspended jail sentence. 
2. The right to counsel must be "jealously protected" and is not waived 
simply by signing a written waiver that purports to waive that right. 
Because of the fundamental and important role played by the right to counsel in a 
criminal proceeding, courts are required to "jealously protect[]" that right. Heaton. 958 
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P.2d at 917. The trial judge has the "weighty responsibility . . . of determining whether 
there is an intelligent and competent waiver by the accused." IcL; see also State v. 
Bakalov. 849 P.2d 629, 633 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("Bakalov I"): State v. Bakalov. 862 
P.2d 1354, 1355 (Utah 1993) ("Bakalov II"): State v. Frampton. 737 P.2d 183, 187 (Utah 
1987). There is a presumption against waiver of the right to counsel, "and doubts 
concerning waiver must be resolved in the defendant's favor." Heaton. 958 P.2d at 917; 
see also State v. Arguelles. 2002 UT 104, f70, 459 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 ("we indulge every 
reasonable presumption against waiver of the right [to counsel]"). 
"[B]efore the court may permit the defendant to proceed without the assistance of 
counsel, the court must conduct a thorough inquiry of the defendant to fulfill its duty of 
insuring that the defendant's waiver of counsel is knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily made." Heaton, 958 P.2d at 917-18. "In making this determination, the court 
must advise the defendant of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation 'so 
that the record will establish that "he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with 
eyes open."'" Heaton, 958 P.2d at 917 (further citation omitted); see. also Arguelles. 
2002 UT 104, ^ |70 (reiterating this requirement); State v. White. 56 N.Y. 2d 110, 118 
(N.Y. 1982) (emphasizing that waiver of the right to counsel is not "a routine rubber-
stampable formality . . . " and that "'a right too easily waived is no right at all'" (further 
citation omitted)). 
The "preferred method of establishing the validity of a waiver is a colloquy on the 
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record between the court and the defendant." Arguelles. 2002 UT 104, f70. "The 
reasoning behind this requirement is that the information necessary for the court to make 
its determination generally 'can only be elicited after penetrating questioning by the trial 
court.'" Heaton, 958 P.2d at 918 (citing VonMoltke. 332 U.S. at 724, for the 
proposition that,f[a] judge can make certain that an accused's professed waiver of 
counsel is understandingly and wisely made only from a penetrating and comprehensive 
examination of all the circumstances'1). 
This Court and the Utah Supreme Court have repeatedly outlined the minimum 
requirements for such a colloquy, requiring that the trial court advise the defendant of the 
dangers and disadvantages of proceeding without counsel, and, in addition, (1) advise the 
defendant of his right to counsel as well as his right to self-representation; (2) ascertain 
that the defendant has the intelligence and capacity to understand and appreciate the 
consequences of proceeding without counsel; and (3) ascertain that the defendant 
understands the nature and elements of the charges, the possible punishments, and any 
other facts that are necessary for an understanding of the case. Arguelles. 2002 UT 104, 
f70 (citing Heaton, 958 P.2d at 918; State v. Petty. 2001 UT App 396, T|6, 38 P.3d 998, 
cert, denied. 42 P.3d 951 (Utah 2002)); see also Frampton, 737 P.2d at 187 n. 12 
(outlining questions a trial court could ask to ascertain whether a defendant knowingly 
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waives his right to counsel).2 In addition to advising the defendant of the dangers and 
disadvantages of proceeding without counsel, the trial court must: 
(1) advise the defendant of his constitutional right to the assistance of 
counsel, as well as his constitutional right to represent himself; (2) ascertain 
that the defendant possesses the intelligence and capacity to understand and 
appreciate the consequences of the decision to represent himself, including 
the expectation that the defendant will comply with technical rules and the 
recognition that presenting a defense is not just a matter of telling one's 
story; and (3) ascertain that the defendant comprehends the nature of the 
charges and proceedings, the range of permissible punishments, and any 
additional facts essential to a broad understanding of the case. 
Heaton, 958 P.2d at 917; see also Areuelles. 2002 UT 104, f70. The "focus is not solely 
on the trial court's express advice," but also on "whether the colloquy clearly establishes 
the defendant's level of understanding." Petty, 2001 UT App 396, ^6 (citing State v. 
McDonald. 922 P.2d 776, 779 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (further citation omitted)); see. also 
Vancleave. 2001 UT App 228, ^fl7. 
When an on-the-record colloquy does not exist, courts consider the record as a 
whole "and make a de novo determination regarding the validity of the defendant's 
waiver only in extraordinary circumstances " Heaton. 958 P.2d at 918. In making 
2
 In a footnote in Frampton, 737 P.2d at 187 n.12, the Utah Supreme Court 
outlined questions that could be asked of a defendant who requests self-representation so 
as to establish that the defendant's waiver of counsel is knowing and voluntary. Those 
questions delve into the defendant's education and background, understanding of the 
legal system and rules governing trials and procedure, and the defendant's understanding 
of the nature of the charges and penalties. The suggested discussion in Frampton also 
includes an admonition advising the defendant against proceeding without counsel and a 
suggestion by the judge that even if the defendant proceeds without counsel that standby 
counsel be appointed. 
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that review, ,l6ff[c]ourts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver" of the 
[right to counsel].'" Id. at 917 (citations omitted). 
In Petty, this Court held that Petty had not knowingly waived his right to counsel 
and reversed Petty's conviction, remanding for a new trial. Petty« 2001 UT App 396, 
<|fl[l1-12. After being informed that Petty wished to represent himself, the trial court 
conducted a brief colloquy with Petty. IcL at J^7. During that colloquy, the court 
questioned Petty regarding his education and understanding of the system, and advised 
Petty against proceeding without counsel. Id. 
[T]he trial court inquired about Petty's education, his general 
understanding of the legal system, his knowledge of the Rules of Evidence 
and Procedure, and informed him that he had the right to counsel as well as 
the right to proceed pro se. The trial court also advised Petty against 
proceeding pro se and selected Petty's appointed counsel to act in a standby 
capacity. 
Id. The trial court did not, however, "address whether Petty '"comprehended the nature 
of the charges and proceedings"' or the range of permissible punishments."' Id_ (quoting 
Heaton, 958 P.2d at 918) (further citation omitted). This Court concluded that "absent a 
discussion of the nature of the charges and the range of possible penalties Petty faced, we 
cannot say that Petty had a proper understanding of the '"dangers and disadvantages of 
self-representation."'" IcL at ^ [8 (further citation omitted). Because the trial court "failed 
to ensure that Petty was fully informed of the risks involved when he made his choice to 
proceed pro se," this Court reversed Petty's conviction and remanded the case for a new 
trial. I d a t ^ n . 
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A plurality of the United States Supreme Court likewise held in Von Moltke that 
the record did not demonstrate that the defendant made a constitutionally adequate 
waiver of the right to counsel. Von Moltke. 332 U.S. 708. The Court reached this 
conclusion even though Ms. Von Moltke appeared before a judge and "signed a paper 
stating that she waived the 'right to be represented by counsel at the trial of this cause/ 
and then pleaded guilty." IdL at 709.3 In addition, the trial judge questioned 
Ms. Von Moltke during the plea hearing and she indicated that she "understood the 
indictment and was voluntarily entering a plea of guilty." IdL. at 717. Further, 
Ms. Von Moltke was an "intelligent, mentally acute woman." Id. at 720. A lawyer was 
temporarily appointed for purposes of the arraignment and Ms. Von Moltke met with two 
lawyers on another occasion, but a lawyer was not appointed to represent her following 
arraignment. Id at 712, 714, 718. She did meet with FBI agents and government 
lawyers and discussed the details of her case and her concerns prior to pleading guilty, 
but the plurality recognized that legal advice from government lawyers is not the type of 
service contemplated by the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Id^ at 715, 725. 
Although Ms. Van Moltke had expressly stated that she waived counsel, the plurality 
3
 Von Moltke is a plurality decision with four justices joining in the lead opinion. 
Those four justices agreed that the record failed to demonstrate a knowing and voluntary 
waiver of the right to counsel and would have reversed the habeas court's decision. Two 
additional justices agreed that the district court judgment should be set aside, but 
believed the lower court should make further findings on the waiver issue. Von Moltke , 
332 U.S. at 726. 
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concluded that the record of the subsequent habeas proceeding nshow[ed] that when 
petitioner pleaded guilty, she did not have that full understanding and comprehension of 
her legal rights indispensable to a valid waiver of the assistance of counsel.11 Id_ at 720. 
The conclusion that Ms. Von Moltke did not make a constitutionally valid waiver 
of her right to counsel even though she expressly waived that right was supported by a 
number of considerations. The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to counsel and 
court-appointed counsel if the defendant is unable to hire a lawyer and courts must 
carefully protect that right. Id at 720. The right to counsel is as important, if not more 
so, when a person pleads guilty as it is when a person goes to trial because, among other 
things, a lawyer is critical in determining whether the state can prove all of the elements 
of the charge. Id. at 721-22. A trial judge has the duty and "solemn obligation" when "a 
defendant appears without counsel to make a thorough inquiry and to take all steps 
necessary to insure the fullest protection of [the right to counsel]." IdL at 722. "This 
duty cannot be discharged as though it were a mere procedural formality." Id. To 
discharge this duty, the judge must make a thorough and penetrating examination of all 
of the circumstances; "[t]he fact that an accused may tell [the judge] that he is informed 
of his right to counsel and desires to waive this right does not automatically end the 
judge's responsibility." Id at 724. Because the record failed to demonstrate that 
Ms. Von Moltke knowingly and voluntarily waived her right to counsel, a majority of the 
court vacated the habeas court's judgment. Id. at 726-27. 
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Von Moltke and Petty, along with a number of other cases, make it clear that 
simply signing a waiver form or stating on the record that one waives the right to counsel 
is not enough to establish a constitutionally valid waiver of the right to counsel. Indeed, 
such a purported waiver along with questioning by the trial court was not sufficient to 
establish a knowing and voluntary waiver in either of those cases. Instead, as Utah 
appellate courts have repeatedly mandated, a trial judge must ensure that the right to 
counsel is carefully protected by (1) advising the defendant of the dangers and 
disadvantages of proceeding pro se, (2) advising the defendant of the right to counsel as 
well as the right to self-representation, (3) ascertaining that the defendant has the 
intelligence and capacity to understand and appreciate the consequences of proceeding 
without counsel, and (4) ascertaining that the defendant understands the nature and 
elements of the charges, the possible punishments including any mandatory punishment, 
and any other facts that might be necessary to understanding the case. 
3. The post-conviction court incorrectly concluded that Mr. Lucero made a 
constitutionally adequate waiver of the right to counsel. 
There is no transcript from the justice court from which to conclude that the 
justice court conducted a constitutionally adequate colloquy with Mr. Lucero or 
otherwise met the requirements for a constitutionally adequate waiver as outlined in 
Heaton, Petty and other cases. Even if this Court were to consider the lack of record in a 
justice court an extraordinary circumstance that justified consideration of the justice 
court docket and filings, those documents fail to establish a constitutionally adequate 
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waiver of the right to counsel. Moreover, even if this Court considers the after-the-fact 
evidence submitted at the post-conviction proceeding, that evidence fails to demonstrate 
that the requirements for a constitutionally adequate waiver, as set forth in Heaton and 
numerous other cases, were met in this case. 
(a) Because there is no record of the colloquy between the justice court 
judge and Mr. Lucero, the post-conviction court incorrectly concluded that 
Mr. Lucero had waived his right to counsel. 
Utah case law is clear that the preferred method for establishing a knowing and 
voluntary waiver of the right to counsel is an on-the-record colloquy between the judge 
and the defendant. Arguelles, 2002 UT 104 at f70. Because a justice court is not a court 
of record, a review of an on-the-record colloquy between the judge and the defendant can 
never be made in a justice court case. Arguably, the lack of a record injustice court 
cases precludes higher courts from ever concluding that the defendant made a knowing 
and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel because in the absence of a record, there is 
no way of ascertaining whether the justice court judge conducted penetrating and 
in depth questioning and otherwise delved into the matter sufficiently to demonstrate a 
knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel. Even in cases where a judge has 
conducted an on-the-record colloquy with the defendant, higher courts have concluded 
that the colloquy was not sufficiently penetrating to demonstrate a knowing and 
voluntary waiver of the right to counsel. See. e^ g. Von Moltke, 332 U.S. at 723-24; Petty, 
2001 UT App 396 at ffi[7-9. Given Mthe central importance of the colloquy in 
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determining whether a defendant has validly waived his right to counsel" (Petty, 2001 
UT App 396 at TJ9), the lack of an on-the record colloquy between the justice court judge 
and Mr. Lucero precluded the district court from concluding that Mr. Lucero made a 
constitutionally adequate waiver of his right to counsel. 
Alternatively, even if this Court were to look beyond the lack of an on-the-record 
colloquy, the review should be limited to a consideration of information found in the 
justice court docket and filings. While the preferred method for establishing waiver of 
the right to counsel is an on-the-record colloquy, Utah case law allows courts to look 
beyond the record of the colloquy to determine whether there was a knowing and 
voluntary waiver of the right to counsel only in extraordinary circumstances. Heaton, 
958 P.2d at 918. When extraordinary circumstances justify looking beyond the colloquy, 
courts look to the record as a whole and make a de novo determination. Id. 
Assuming for the sake of argument that the absence of a record injustice court is 
an extraordinary circumstance that justifies considering something other than an on-the-
record colloquy in determining whether a criminal defendant made a constitutionally 
adequate waiver of the right to counsel, it would seem that any review of "the record as a 
whole" would go no further than a review of the justice court docket and the papers filed 
in the justice court. In other words, in order to follow the mandate of this Court and the 
Utah Supreme Court, courts would look no further than the docket and documents filed 
in the justice court in determining whether a defendant knowingly and voluntarily 
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waived the right to counsel. Such an approach is consistent with Heaton . Petty and other 
cases that allow, at most, a review of the record as a whole. 
Moreover, such an approach prevents the temptation to reach a post-judgment 
rationalization or tainting of what actually occurred. See generally State v. Ramirez, 817 
P.2d 774, 789 (Utah 1991) (refusing to remand a case for findings and to allow the trial 
judge to address an admissibility question where there was conflicting evidence and such 
a remand would "tempt [the court] to reach a post hoc rationalization for the admission 
of this pivotal evidence" and that lf[s]uch a mode of proceeding holds too much potential 
for abuse"). Allowing a judge or court personnel to testify after the fact as to the details 
of a colloquy would hold an enormous potential for abuse and fail, due to faulty 
memories and lack of detail, to ensure that waivers of counsel are knowingly and 
voluntarily made. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-121 (2002) requires justice courts to keep a docket which 
includes, among other things, "minutes of the pleadings and motions in writing by 
referring to them, and if not in writing, by a concise statement of the material parts of the 
pleadings." "Entries in a justice court judge's docket under 78-5-121, certified by the 
judge or his successor in office, are prima facie evidence of the facts stated." Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-5-122 (2002V, see also State v. Bailev. 282 P.2d 339, 341 (Utah 1955) (justice 
court docket is prima facie evidence of facts stated in the docket). Because the justice 
court is required to keep entries of what transpires, these provisions further demonstrate 
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that even if courts were to look beyond the on-the-record colloquy requirement when 
determining whether a constitutionally adequate waiver of counsel was made injustice 
court, the consideration should be limited to the justice court docket and filings, rather 
than general, after-the-fact testimony. 
This Court's decision in State v. Gutierrez. 2003 UT App 95, 470 Utah Adv. Rep. 
52 does not require consideration of testimony from court personnel regarding the details 
of the proceedings in the context of this case. The issue in Gutierrez was whether a 
justice court plea was involuntary; Heaton and other case law that ordinarily requires a 
review of the plea colloquy and allows only in extraordinary circumstances a review of 
the record as a whole for determining whether counsel was waived was not implicated in 
Gutierrez. Instead, this Court was considering in Gutierrez whether a defendant's claim 
in an enhanced DUI case that his prior convictions injustice court were involuntary 
could be supported solely by the defendant's "self-serving affidavit." Gutierrez. 2003 
UT App 95, ^ [11. This Court stated that when challenging the voluntariness of plea in 
that context, "a defendant seeking to rebut the presumption of regularity must produce a 
transcript, testimony regarding taking of the plea, a docket sheet, or other affirmative 
evidence.11 Id While Gutierrez allows a defendant challenging the voluntariness of a 
plea to submit testimony from court personnel regarding the details of the proceedings in 
the context of that case, it does not necessarily follow that the justice court can submit 
such testimony in a case where a defendant claims that he did not make a constitutionally 
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adequate waiver of counsel. This is so because case law regarding waiver of the right to 
counsel requires a review of the plea colloquy or, at most, a review of the record as a 
whole in extraordinary circumstances. 
In this case where the justice court docket and file fail to demonstrate a 
constitutionally adequate waiver of the right to counsel, consideration of testimony by 
court personnel is unwarranted. This Court need not reach the issue of whether 
testimony from court personnel is appropriate, however, because even if all of the 
evidence submitted at the post-conviction hearing is considered, it fails to demonstrate a 
knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel. 
(b) Even if the "record" as a whole is considered, the justice court docket 
and plea affidavit fail to demonstrate a knowing and voluntary waiver of 
the right to counsel; additionally, the materials submitted at the habeas 
hearing, when considered along with the docket and plea affidavit, fail to 
demonstrate a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel 
Although the justice court is charged with keeping a concise statement of what 
occurred (see Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-121), the docket in this case does not contain 
findings or conclusions by the justice court that Mr. Lucero knowingly and voluntarily 
waived his right to counsel. R. 28-33. Nor is there any indication in the docket that the 
justice court judge conducted a colloquy with Mr. Lucero regarding waiver of counsel or 
otherwise took the necessary steps to establish a knowing and voluntary waiver of the 
right to counsel. It appears from the docket that the judge never made a determination 
that Mr. Lucero knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel and instead 
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proceeded with the case without ever conducting the type of penetrating questioning that 
is required for a constitutionally valid waiver of the right to counsel. 
The absence of a record of the plea colloquy coupled with the failure of the justice 
court to make findings and conclusions that Mr. Lucero knowingly and voluntarily 
waived his right to counsel precludes such a conclusion after the fact. See generally 
Petty. 2001 UT App 396 at «|9 (further citation omitted) (pointing out that "'[appellate] 
court's proper role is to review the trial court's findings and conclusions and then 
determine whether the trial court correctly concluded that the defendant validly waived 
counsel'"). Indeed, in a non-record court where a summary of any hearings are included 
in the docket, the failure to include a notation that the judge determined that the 
defendant waived counsel should preclude a higher court from determining that the judge 
made such a determination.4 
Moreover, regardless of whether the justice court judge concluded that 
Mr. Lucero waived his right to counsel, the docket and plea affidavit do not demonstrate 
a constitutionally adequate waiver of that right. As a preliminary matter, in order to 
consider the contents of the plea affidavit, that affidavit must be incorporated into the 
4
 The lack of notation that the judge conducted a colloquy or found that 
Mr. Lucero waived counsel is particularly significant in light of the fact that a notation 
appears in the docket indicating that at sentencing, the judge found Mr. Lucero to be 
impecunious. The sentencing notation regarding Mr. Lucero's impecuniosity 
demonstrates that the justice court would include a notation if it conducted a colloquy 
regarding waiver of counsel or found that Mr. Lucero had waived counsel. 
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plea colloquy as required by Utah case law. See State v. Maguire. 830 P.2d 216, 217-8 
(Utah 1991); State v. Visser. 2000 UT 88,1fl5,22 P.3d 1242; State v. Gibbons ,740 P.2d 
1309, 1312-14 (Utah 1987). The trial court must personally establish during the 
colloquy "that the defendant has read, has understood, and acknowledges all of the 
information contained [in the affidavit]." Visser, 2000 UT 88,1fi|l 1-12. An affidavit can 
be considered when the trial court questions the defendant during the plea hearing and 
ascertains that the defendant read and understood the affidavit, and clarifies any 
ambiguities, omissions or uncertainties. State v. Smith, 812 P.2d 470,476-77 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991). 
In this case, the docket fails to even mention the plea affidavit, let alone include 
notations indicating that the justice court judge personally established that Mr. Lucero 
had read and understood the affidavit. Instead, it indicates that f,[t]he Information is 
read11 and the "Court advises defendant of rights and penalties." R. 31. 
Nor does the proffer of the justice court judge's testimony indicate that the judge 
personally established that Mr. Lucero read and understood the plea affidavit. Reading 
the information and advising a defendant of his rights and penalties is not sufficient to 
incorporate an affidavit. Maguire., 830 P.2d at 217-18. Nor is the signature of the 
defendant indicating that he read the affidavit sufficient to incorporate it. IcL Instead, the 
affidavit itself must be discussed and its contents clarified in order to incorporate the 
affidavit into the plea proceeding. Visser. 2000 UT 88, f p 1-12. While the affidavit 
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itself states that the judge or a lawyer has explained the constitutional rights, and the 
defendant has read and understands the contents of the affidavit (R. 16-17), these 
statements do not indicate that the judge discussed the affidavit with the defendant 
during the hearing or otherwise took the steps necessary to ensure that Mr. Lucero had 
read, understood, and acknowledged the affidavit. Under Utah case law, the lack of a 
record demonstrating that the judge ascertained that Mr. Lucero had read and understood 
the affidavit and clarified any ambiguities precludes the incorporation of the plea 
affidavit into the plea colloquy. 
Even if the affidavit is considered, however, the affidavit and docket fail to 
demonstrate a constitutionally adequate waiver of the right to counsel. The marshaled 
evidence found in the docket and plea affidavit in support of a determination that 
Mr. Lucero waived his right to counsel is as follows5: 
1. At the arraignment on June 14, 2001, Mr. Lucero was ff[a]dvised of 
rights and penalties." R. 29. 
2. The pretrial conference was continued twice because Mr. Lucero "will 
look into retaining private counsel" and was "retaining private counsel." 
R.30. 
5
 A determination that a criminal defendant made a constitutionally adequate 
waiver is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. See. Vancleave. 2001 UT 
App at ^ |5. Any factual findings supporting that determination are reviewed for clear 
error. Although this issue involves a question of law, Mr. Lucero marshals the evidence 
for the court's convenience. 
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3. The case was set over for a bench trial after the second scheduled 
pretrial conference. At the bench trial hearing, the Information was read 
and "the Court advise[d] defendant of rights and penalties." R. 31. 
4. The plea affidavit, entitled "Driving Under the Influence Rights 
Waiver" was signed by Mr. Lucero. It contains a paragraph regarding the 
right to counsel that states: 
COUNSEL: I have the right to consult with and be 
represented by an attorney. If the judge were to determine 
that I am too poor to be able to hire a lawyer, then the judge 
could appoint one to represent me. I might later, if the judge 
determined I was able, be required to pay for the appointed 
lawyer's service to me. 
R. 15. 
5. Following this paragraph regarding the right to counsel, five additional 
constitutional rights are addressed. On page two of the form, after the last 
of these constitutional rights is addressed, the form contains a paragraph 
that states: 
I understand each of these constitutional rights. They have 
been explained to me by the judge or a lawyer. I have no 
question about them. I know that I could plead not guilty and 
exercise all of the rights listed above. I understand that by 
entering a plea of guilty, [sic] I AM GIVING UP THESE 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. 
R. 16. The affidavit is signed on page four. R. 18. 
The additional marshaled evidence presented at the habeas hearing is as follows: 
1. The arraignment clerk submitted an affidavit that did not include a 
specific recollection of Mr. Lucero's case and instead outlined the justice 
court judge's usual practice at arraignment. That usual practice included 
"orally advis[ing] each defendant of their rights, including the right to be 
represented by an attorney before he asks the defendant how they wish to 
plead." R. 77. The arraignment clerk had a "convincing belief1 that the 
judge "informed Mr. Lucero of his constitutional rights, including his right 
to be represented by an attorney and that if he could not afford to hire his 
own attorney, that one would be appointed for him free of charge." R. 77. 
31 
2. The arraignment clerk's affidavit also indicated that it was the justice 
court judge's usual practice to confirm prior to arraignment that each 
defendant watched the "Rights of Criminal Defendants" videotape narrated 
by former Judge Hutchings ["Hutchings videotape"]. 
3. The Hutchings videotape states in regard to the right to counsel: 
If you plead guilty or no contest, you will not have a trial and you will be 
giving up or waiving certain rights. These rights are: 
Also, the right to hire your own lawyer to represent you. If you will be 
hiring your own lawyer, please tell the judge today. If you want to have a 
lawyer represent you and if you do not have the money to hire one, you can 
ask the judge to appoint a public defender. You will need to tell the judge 
about your financial situation and the judge will decide if you qualify for a 
public defender. 
See transcript of Hutchings videotape in Addendum E. 
4. Another in-court clerk submitted a similar affidavit. It also contained 
information about the judge's usual practice, but nothing specific to this 
case. According to the affidavit, the judge's usual practice is "prior to 
accepting any guilty plea, [the judge] orally advises each defendant of their 
rights, including the right to be represented by an attorney." R. 85-6. 
This second clerk also had a "convincing belief that the justice court judge 
"informed Mr. Lucero of his constitutional rights, including the right to be 
represented by an attorney and that if he could not afford to hire his own 
attorney, that one would be appointed for him free of charge if he qualified 
based on income." R. 86. 
5. The second clerk also indicated that Mr. Lucero had executed a written 
waiver of rights form. R. 86. This is the plea affidavit referred to above. 
6. Counsel for the justice court proffered the testimony of the justice court 
judge. The proffer included information about the judge's usual practice, 
but no details specific to Mr. Lucero's case. The judge's usual practice is 
to have defendants sign the waiver in the affidavit, then tell defendants, 
"now that you've signed these things and waived your rights, I need to 
satisfy my mind that you're doing so freely and voluntarily and you 
understand the consequences of it and he goes through those things one by 
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one." R. 116:16-17. The judge goes through the elements, sentences, and 
rights being waived, including the right to counsel. R. 116:16-17. As part 
of the proffer, counsel indicated that the justice court judge correctly stated 
the constitutional right to counsel does not always include the right to court 
appointed counsel when someone cannot afford a lawyer. R. 116:16-17. 
7. Counsel for the justice court also proffered that the judge could not 
remember whether he asked Mr. Lucero about his assets, but the judge's 
usual practice when a defendant asks for an attorney is to ask about assets 
and income. 
(i) The justice court judge did not inform Mr. Lucero of the dangers and 
disadvantages of proceeding without counsel 
Neither the docket nor the plea affidavit demonstrate in any way that the justice 
court judge informed Mr. Lucero of the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding pro se. 
See Arguelles, 2002 UT 104 at TJ70. Advising a defendant of rights and penalties is 
distinct from advising a defendant of the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding 
pro se. Since advising a defendant of the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding 
pro se is necessary for a waiver of the constitutional right to counsel (see. e.g. Heaton, 
958 P.2d at 918), the absence of an indication in the docket and plea affidavit that the 
judge gave such an admonition precludes the finding of a knowing and voluntary waiver 
of the right to counsel. The district court therefore incorrectly concluded that Mr. Lucero 
knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. 
Even if this Court looks beyond the justice court docket and filings, the evidence 
presented as part of the habeas proceeding likewise fails to demonstrate that the justice 
court advised Mr. Lucero of the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding without 
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counsel. The information presented by the justice court was not specific to Mr. Lucero's 
case. R. 77-78, 85-86, 116:17-18, 26. Further, it failed to contain any suggestion that 
the justice court judge had discussed with Mr. Lucero the dangers and disadvantages of 
proceeding pro se. Li Indeed, the judge's proffer and affidavit suggest that the judge 
believed a general recitation of rights along with a general waiver was sufficient to 
proceed without counsel. R. 116:17-18. This failure to advise the defendant of the 
dangers and disadvantages of proceeding pro se precludes a determination that 
Mr. Lucero made a constitutionally adequate waiver of the right to counsel. 
00 The justice court judge did not clearly and correctly advise Mr. Lucero 
regarding his right to counsel and did not advise him regarding his right to 
self-representation. 
The docket and plea affidavit also fail to demonstrate that the justice court judge 
clearly and correctly advised Mr. Lucero regarding his Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
as well as his right to self-representation. Mr. Lucero therefore did not make a 
constitutionally adequate waiver of his right to counsel. 
There is no indication in either the docket or affidavit that the justice court judge 
advised Mr. Lucero that the right to self-representation is a distinct constitutional right. 
Such an admonition is necessary for a constitutionally adequate waiver of the right to 
counsel. See Heaton, 958 P.2d at 917. Advising a defendant that s/he has a 
constitutional right to self-representation is important in demonstrating a knowing waiver 
because it emphasizes that proceeding without counsel is a choice being made by a 
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criminal defendant rather than a fallback position when the defendant is unable to retain 
counsel. 
Additionally, as far as the advice given concerning the right to counsel, the docket 
and plea affidavit fail to demonstrate that Mr. Lucero was correctly advised regarding the 
nature of this right. The docket states that the justice court judge advised Mr. Lucero of 
his rights on two occasions. The docket does not specify what rights were covered or the 
nature of what was said regarding each right. Given the fundamental importance of the 
right to counsel, it cannot be presumed from this general notation that the justice court 
judge correctly advised Mr. Lucero regarding the right to counsel, or even that he 
specifically discussed the right to counsel. Judges often list rights, thinking they are 
covering all relevant constitutional rights, and nevertheless miss something. See e.g. 
State v. TarnawieckL 2000 UT App 186, f*, 5 P.3d 1222. 
Moreover, the depiction of the right to counsel in the plea affidavit suggests that 
the right is not absolute, and instead, that the judge has discretion as to whether to 
appoint counsel. R. 15. Rather than clearly stating that a defendant has the 
constitutional right to counsel and if the defendant is indigent, a constitutional right to 
appointed counsel, the affidavit never indicates the constitutional magnitude of the right 
and instead suggests that the right to counsel is qualified, that the decision as to whether 
to appoint counsel is discretionary with the judge, and that even if counsel is appointed, 
the defendant might be required to pay for counsel. R. 15. The affidavit states: 
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COUNSEL: I have the right to consult with and to be represented by an 
attorney. If the judge were to determine that I am too poor to be able to 
hire a lawyer, then the judge could appoint one to represent me. I might 
later, if the judge determined I was able, be required to pay for the 
appointed lawyer's service to me. 
R. 15 (emphasis added). This passage does not clearly convey that an indigent criminal 
defendant has a constitutional right to court-appointed counsel. Instead, it states that if 
the judge decides that someone is unable to afford to retain counsel, the judge could i.e. 
may or may not appoint counsel. Because the affidavit and docket do not demonstrate 
that Mr. Lucero was clearly and correctly advised regarding the right to counsel as well 
as the right to proceed pro se, the district court erroneously concluded that Mr. Lucero 
made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to counsel. 
The existence of the Hutchings videotape also does not correctly clarify the nature 
of the right to counsel or otherwise establish that Mr. Lucero was correctly and 
adequately advised regarding the nature of this right. Nothing in the justice court file 
indicates that this videotape was shown to Mr. Lucero.6 Additionally, nothing suggests 
6
 According to one of the affidavits filed by the court clerks, the justice court 
judge routinely shows the Hutchings videotape to criminal defendants prior to 
arraignment. Nothing in this affidavit or the record states that the tape was shown to 
Mr. Lucero. Additionally, nothing in the affidavit or elsewhere suggests that the judge 
attempted to incorporate the videotape into the plea colloquy or the arraignment hearing 
by asking Mr. Lucero whether he watched, understood and acknowledged the 
information in the videotape. Since it is necessary to make sure a defendant read and 
understood a plea affidavit in order to incorporate that affidavit into a plea hearing (see 
Maguire. 830 P.2d at 217-18; Smith, 812 P.2d at 476-77), it follows that at the very least, 
a judge must make sure the defendant has watched, understood and acknowledges the 
information in the videotape in order to incorporate the videotape. Since a plea affidavit 
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that even if Mr. Lucero was shown the videotape at arraignment, that videotape was 
incorporated into the plea hearing by the justice judge asking Mr. Lucero whether he 
watched, understood and acknowledged the contents of the videotape. See Maguire, 830 
P.2d at 217-18 (in order to incorporate the plea affidavit, the judge must ascertain that 
defendant read, understands and acknowledges the contents of the plea affidavit). The 
contents of the videotape therefore should play no role in determining whether the justice 
court adequately informed Mr. Lucero of the nature of his right to counsel. 
Mr. Lucero's acknowledgment as part of the post-conviction proceedings that he 
"pretty much" watched the videotape does not change this result. Mr. Lucero's testimony 
does not establish that Mr. Lucero watched the entire tape or understood the contents. 
Without questioning by the judge and information that Mr. Lucero watched and listened 
to the entire tape and understood its contents, the videotape should not be considered. 
Even if it is considered, however, the videotape fails to clarify the nature of the 
right to counsel. Rather than clearly indicating that an indigent defendant has the 
absolute right to court-appointed counsel, the videotape suggests that appointment of 
counsel is discretionary with the judge. The tape never states that an indigent defendant 
has a constitutional right to court-appointed counsel. Instead, it begins by telling 
is specific to a defendant's case whereas the videotape is general in nature and shown to 
a room full of people, it also follows that a court wishing to rely on the contents of the 
videotape as part of a waiver of rights must do something more to incorporate the 
videotape than is required for incorporation of a plea affidavit. 
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defendants they have the right to hire their own lawyers. It later tells the defendant that if 
he does not have money to hire a lawyer, he "can ask the judge to appoint a public 
defender" and "the judge will decide if you qualify for a public defender." Tape at 3; see. 
Addendum E. In regard to the right to counsel, the tape states: 
Also, the right to hire your own lawyer to represent you. If you will 
be hiring your own lawyer, please tell the judge today. If you want to have 
a lawyer represent you and if you do not have the money to hire one, you 
can ask the judge to appoint a public defender. You will need to tell the 
judge about your financial situation and the judge will decide if you qualify 
for a public defender. 
See Addendum E at 3. This passage fails to inform a defendant that he has an absolute 
constitutional right to court-appointed counsel if he is indigent, and fails to ensure that 
the right to counsel is "jealously protected." 
Moreover, the additional testimony presented at the post-conviction hearing 
indicates that the judge did not consider the right to appointed counsel absolute even 
when a defendant cannot afford to retain counsel. According to the proffer made by 
counsel for the justice court, the justice court believed the right to court-appointed 
counsel did not apply in all cases where a defendant could not afford to retain counsel. 
R. 116:17. The proffer states in part: 
Now there's some - - in the petition, there is a memorandum, she 
says it's a little unclear as to whether he really has a right or whether he 
doesn't. I asked [the justice court judge] about that and he says, well, in 
fact, it - - the way it's stated is exactly correct. That is to say, if a - - if - -
you're not always afforded an attorney because you can't afford one. 
I mean, many of us, if we were charged with a serious crime probably 
couldn't afford an attorney. 
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R. 116:16-17. Contrary to this statement, in any case where a defendant is unable to 
retain counsel without jeopardizing his ability to provide basic necessities for himself 
and his family, the Sixth Amendment requires that counsel be appointed. See State v. 
Vincent, 883 P.2d 278, 282-83 (Utah 1994). This proffer further demonstrates that the 
justice court failed to clearly and correctly inform Mr. Lucero that he had the right to 
appointment of counsel if he were indigent. 
Because the trial court failed to adequately advise Mr. Lucero that he had the 
constitutional right to self-representation as well as the constitutional right to court-
appointed counsel, the district court erred in concluding that Mr. Lucero made a knowing 
and voluntary waiver of his right to counsel. 
(Hi) There is no evidence that the justice court judge ascertained that 
Mr. Lucero possessed the intelligence and capacity to understand and 
appreciate the consequences of proceeding pro se. 
Additionally, nothing in the docket or plea affidavit demonstrates that the justice 
court ascertained that Mr. Lucero possessed the intelligence and capacity to understand 
and appreciate the consequences of proceeding pro se. Advising a defendant of rights 
and penalties is not enough to establish a constitutionally adequate waiver; instead, 
among other things, the trial judge must also engage the defendant in a colloquy that is 
sufficiently in-depth that the judge can ascertain that the defendant understands the 
consequences of proceeding without a lawyer. The judge must not only advise the 
defendant regarding his right to counsel and self-representation as well as the dangers 
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and disadvantages of proceeding pro se, but must also determine that the defendant has a 
level of understanding that is sufficient to establish a constitutionally adequate waiver of 
the right to counsel. See Petty, 2001 UT App 236 at %7. 
Nothing in the docket or plea affidavit demonstrates that the justice court 
ascertained that Mr. Lucero possessed the intelligence and capacity to understand and 
appreciate the consequences of proceeding without counsel. In fact, the docket 
demonstrates that Mr. Lucero was confused and did not understand the consequences of 
proceeding without a lawyer since he called and told the clerk that he would not have a 
trial and instead just pay the fine. R. 31. Since "just paying a fine11 is not a possible 
outcome for a DUI conviction, this notation demonstrates Mr. Lucero's lack of 
understanding. Moreover, the docket demonstrates that when Mr. Lucero "called to 
inform the court that he would like to just pay [the] fine instead of trial" (R. 31), the 
justice court did nothing to dispel Mr. Lucero's incorrect understanding of the 
consequences. Instead, the docket indicates that "Def. will call the city to inform them of 
his decission [sic]" (R. 31), suggesting that the court left Mr. Lucero with the incorrect 
perception that he could simply pay a fine if he chose not to take the DUI case to trial. 
The information introduced at the habeas proceeding likewise does not 
demonstrate that the justice court ascertained that Mr. Lucero possessed the intelligence 
and capacity to understand and appreciate the consequences of proceeding pro se. 
Indeed, nothing in either the docket or the habeas proceedings suggests that the justice 
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court judge understood that such an ascertainment was a necessary part of a waiver of 
counsel. See R. 28-31; 116:16-17. 
Mr. Lucero's only previous involvement with the criminal justice system was in 
the 1970fs, approximately thirty years ago. R. 116:22. The length of time since the prior 
involvement suggests a lack of familiarity with the criminal justice system and the 
consequences he faced. Other than this very distant involvement in the criminal justice 
system, there is nothing in the record about Mr. Lucero's educational background or 
familiarity with the rules of procedure and evidence or criminal law. This missing 
information coupled with the obvious confusion Mr. Lucero had about the consequences 
he faced establishes not only that the justice court did not make the necessary 
determination as to Mr. Lucero's intelligence and capacity, but also that Mr. Lucero 
lacked the capacity to understand and appreciate the consequences of proceeding without 
counsel. The district court therefore incorrectly concluded that Mr. Lucero made a 
constitutionally adequate waiver of his right to counsel. 
(iv) The justice court judge did not ascertain that Mr. Lucero understood 
the nature and elements of the charges, the possible penalties and other 
facts necessary for an understanding of the case. 
In order to have a constitutionally adequate waiver of the right to counsel, the 
record must also demonstrate that the defendant understood the nature and elements of 
the charges, the possible punishment, and any other facts necessary for an understanding 
of the case. The record does not demonstrate such an understanding or that the justice 
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court ascertained that Mr. Lucero had such an understanding. 
The docket shows that Mr. Lucero "called to inform the court that he would like to 
just pay fine instead of trial. Def. will call the city to inform them of his decission [sic].'1 
R. 31. Since "just pay[ing] fine]" is not an option in a DUI case, this entry demonstrates 
that Mr. Lucero did not understand the potential penalties he faced; s_ee_ discussion supra 
at 40. Nothing in the docket suggests that the justice court made any effort to correct 
Mr. Lucero's misunderstanding. In fact, the entry suggests that the court may have 
enhanced the misunderstanding by giving the impression that Mr. Lucero could make 
such a decision. R. 31. 
Additionally, the plea affidavit was not properly incorporated and should not be 
considered; see discussion supra at 28-30. Even if the plea affidavit were properly 
incorporated, however, it fails to correct Mr. Lucero's misunderstanding. The affidavit 
contains a general recitation of the potential penalties for class B and C misdemeanors. It 
does not specify, however, the designation for DUI and does specifically state that a plea 
of guilty to this charge carries a potential sentence of six months. Moreover, the plea 
affidavit does not mention that DUI carries a mandatory jail sentence. Even if 
Mr. Lucero had not evidenced confusion about the potential sentence, this affidavit is 
defective in conveying the required information about potential sentence because it does 
not inform Mr. Lucero that he faced a potential sentence of six months jail and would 
serve at least two days of mandatory jail time. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(4) (Supp. 
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2002). In the face of Mr. Lucero's obviously incorrect perception about the potential 
sentence he faced, this defective recitation of potential sentences for class B and C 
misdemeanors fails to demonstrate that Mr. Lucero understood the potential penalty. 
The proffer at the habeas proceedings that as a general practice, the judge "goes 
through the possible sentences11 likewise fails to demonstrate that the judge ascertained 
that Mr. Lucero understood the possible penalties he faced. The judge's usual routine 
does not establish that in this case the judge followed that routine. Additionally, there is 
no way of knowing whether the judge clarified that DUI is a class B misdemeanor with 
mandatory jail or just reiterated the general information in the plea affidavit regarding 
potential sentences for class B and C misdemeanors. Also, since the plea affidavit fails 
to mention the mandatory jail, it seems likely that the judge would not mention that at the 
hearing. Moreover, even if the judge correctly stated that potential penalty, nothing 
demonstrates that Mr. Lucero understood the penalty he faced. Given the fact that the 
justice court docket establishes that Mr. Lucero did not understand that he faced a jail 
sentence, the general proffer submitted at the post-conviction hearing fails to establish 
that Mr. Lucero understood the potential penalties he faced. 
Additionally, assuming for the purposes of argument that the plea affidavit was 
properly incorporated and can be considered, that affidavit was defective under Rule 11, 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and due process. While Mr. Lucero is not asking to 
withdraw his guilty plea, the defectiveness of the affidavit under Rule 11 and due process 
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is nevertheless pertinent because it fails to establish that Mr. Lucero understood the 
nature and elements of the charges, the possible punishments and any other facts 
necessary to an understanding of the case. Strict compliance with the Rule 11 
requirements is mandated so that the record establishes that a defendant understood the 
nature and consequences of pleading guilty and acted knowingly and voluntarily when he 
entered the guilty plea and waived his constitutional rights. See Gibbons. 740 P.2d at 
1312-14. When a defendant waives his right to counsel along with other rights while 
pleading guilty and the guilty plea is not in compliance with Rule 11 and due process, 
any purported waiver of counsel is likewise not knowing and voluntary since the record 
fails to demonstrate that the defendant understood the nature and elements of the charges, 
the possible punishments, and any other facts that are necessary for an understanding of 
the case. 
Aside from not being properly incorporated, the affidavit in this case fails to 
comply with Rule 11 and due process in several substantial ways. Rule 11(e)(1) 
mandates that a court find not only that the defendant waived the right to counsel, but 
also that the defendant "does not desire counsel" in cases where the defendant is not 
represented. The docket shows that Mr. Lucero was trying to retain counsel; this 
suggests that he wanted counsel, not that he did not desire counsel. Nothing else 
suggests that Mr. Lucero did not desire counsel in this case. Moreover, Mr. Lucero 
testified at the post-conviction proceeding that he asked for court-appointed counsel and 
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the request was denied. 
The affidavit also does not inform the defendant that he has the right to trial by an 
impartial jury; nor does it state that the defendant has the right to a speedy trial. See 
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(3); Tarnawiecki. 2000 UT App 186,1(916-18 (plain error occurs 
when a trial court fails to inform a defendant that he has the right to a speedy trial where 
the plea is taken prior to the start of trial). Additionally, the affidavit does not inform the 
defendant that the right to appeal is limited. See. Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(8). Further, 
while the affidavit lists the general punishment for class B and class C misdemeanors, it 
does not specify that DUI is a class B misdemeanor. Nor does the affidavit state that a 
DUI charge carries a mandatory jail sentence; Rule 11(e)(6) requires such information as 
part of the informing defendant of penalty. The affidavit also does not contain a factual 
basis for the plea. See Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(4)(B); Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1313 (a plea 
"cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant possesses an understanding of the law in 
relation to the facts . . . " ) . 
The wholly inadequate affidavit utilized in this case failed to inform Mr. Lucero 
of the nature and elements of the charges, the possible penalties and any other facts 
necessary for an understanding of this case. Because the docket and affidavit fail to 
demonstrate that Mr. Lucero understood the nature of the charges, how the required 
elements related to his actions, the mandatory jail sentence attached to DUIs, the fact that 
he had the right to a speedy trial by an impartial jury, the fact that he had a limited right 
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to appeal, and whether he did not desire counsel, the docket and affidavit failed to 
demonstrate the third required factor for a knowing and voluntary waiver. The district 
court therefore erred in concluding that Mr. Lucero made a constitutionally adequate 
waiver of his right to counsel. 
(v) The district court erred in concluding that Mr. Lucero knowingly and 
voluntarily waived his right to counsel 
The district court erred in concluding that Mr. Lucero made a constitutionally 
adequate waiver of his right to counsel in this case where the requirements set forth in 
Heaton and other cases were not met; see discussion supra at 33-45. Nothing in the 
justice court record or the record from the post-conviction proceeding suggests that 
Mr. Lucero requested self-representation or proceeded without counsel because he 
wished to represent himself. Instead, the record shows that he desired counsel since the 
pretrial conference was continued twice while Mr. Lucero attempted to retain counsel. 
R. 29, 30. Mr. Lucero testified that he had asked the justice court to appoint counsel, 
but the court refused. R. 116:22. This case is even clearer than Heaton and Petty in 
demonstrating that counsel was not waived because in those cases, the defendant had 
asked to proceed without counsel. Moreover, the fact that Mr. Lucero desired counsel 
works against a determination that he knowingly and voluntarily waived counsel. 
Additionally, while a court is required to take a constitutionally adequate waiver 
of the right to counsel regardless of whether a defendant is entitled to court-appointed 
counsel, the fact that Mr. Lucero was indigent and entitled to court-appointed counsel 
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also weighs against a determination that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to 
counsel in this case. The justice court record establishes that Mr. Lucero was indigent 
when he was sentenced. Indeed, the justice court found him to be impecunious at 
sentencing. R. 33. The affidavit filed as part of the post-conviction proceedings likewise 
demonstrates that Mr. Lucero was indigent when he entered his plea. R. 19-22. He had 
assets totaling $3500 and liabilities in the same amount. In addition, he spent $800 a 
month to live. R. 19-22. He had not worked since before the plea hearing. R. 21. The 
justice court's factual finding that Mr. Lucero was impecunious along with the affidavit 
filed in the post-conviction proceeding demonstrate that Mr. Lucero was unable to retain 
counsel due to his poverty. See generally Vincent. 883 P.2d at 283 (a defendant is 
entitled to court-appointed counsel if payments to counsel "would place undue hardship 
on the defendant's ability to provide the basic necessities of life for the defendant and the 
defendant's family"). 
Mr. Lucero testified that he had asked for court-appointed counsel and such 
request had been denied. The record from the post-conviction proceeding demonstrates 
that although Mr. Lucero was indigent, he was never provided with the opportunity for 
court-appointed counsel. Proceeding without counsel when the right to court-appointed 
counsel has been denied is not a constitutionally adequate waiver of the right to counsel. 
Indeed, the failure to provide Mr. Lucero with court-appointed counsel violated the Sixth 
Amendment. See Shelton, 535 U.S. at 658. 
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This case does not turn on whether Mr. Lucero is indigent, however. Even if 
Mr. Lucero had not been indigent, the Sixth Amendment required that the justice court 
judge go through the steps outlined in Heaton and other cases in order to demonstrate a 
constitutionally adequate waiver of the right to counsel. While a defendant who refuses 
to hire counsel even though he is able to afford to do so may be found to voluntarily 
waive the right to counsel based on that refusal, a court nevertheless is required to 
adequately advise that defendant regarding the risks and disadvantages of proceeding in 
that fashion and otherwise ascertain that the defendant is proceeding without counsel in a 
knowing and voluntary fashion. 
In this case, the justice court (1) did not inform Mr. Lucero of the dangers and 
disadvantages of proceeding without counsel, (2) did not clearly and correctly advise 
Mr. Lucero regarding the nature of his right to counsel or that he had the right to self-
representation, (3) did not ascertain that Mr. Lucero possessed the intelligence and 
capacity to understand and appreciate the consequences of proceeding pro se, and (4) did 
not ascertain that Mr. Lucero understood the nature and elements of the charges, the 
possible penalties and other facts necessary for an understanding of the case. Since 
failure to demonstrate any of these precludes a determination that a constitutionally 
adequate waiver of the right to counsel was made, the failure to do all four leaves no 
question that Mr. Lucero did not waive his right to counsel. 
Indeed, nothing in this record suggests that Mr. Lucero made a decision to 
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proceed without counsel, let alone, that he "'understood] the risks he face[d] in making 
that decision[].'n State v. Balderrama, 2003 UT App 139, T|4 (unpublished) (quoting 
Petty, 2001 UT App 396 at ^|6). Mr. Lucero did know what he was doing and did not 
proceed with his eyes open. See Heaton, 958 P.2d at 912. Under these circumstances, 
the post-conviction court erred in concluding that Mr. Lucero waived his right to 
counsel. 
B. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT VIOLATION REQUIRES THAT THE 
SUSPENDED JAIL SENTENCE BE VACATED. 
The United States Supreme Court held in Shelton "that a suspended sentence that 
may 'end up in the actual deprivation of a person's liberty' may not be imposed unless 
the defendant was accorded 'the guiding hand of counsel' in the prosecution of the crime 
charged." Shelton, 535 U.S. at 658. Because of the Sixth Amendment violation in 
Shelton. the Court affirmed the decision of the Alabama Supreme Court invalidating the 
portion of Shelton's sentence that imposed a suspended jail term. Id. at 659, 674. The 
Sixth Amendment violation in this case likewise requires that the aspect of Mr. Lucero's 
sentence that imposes a suspended jail sentence must be invalidated. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant/Petitioner/Defendant Benjamin Frank Lucero respectfully requests that 
this Court reverse the decision of the district court and order that the suspended jail 
sentence be vacated. 
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day of May, 2003. 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
HEATHER BRERETON 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT jQC T 2 5 2002 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH _j*LtiAKE COUNTY 
BENJAMIN FRANK LUCERO, 
Petitioner/Defendant 
vs. 
SHERIFF AARON D. KENNARD; CHIEF 
PAUL CUNNINGHAM; SALT LAKE 
COUNTY JAIL; MURRAY CITY 
JUSTICE COURT, 
Respondents/Plaintiff. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
& ORDER OF THE COURT 
Civil Case No. 020907208 
Judge: GLENN K. IWASAKI 
Deputy Clo< 
On September 16,2002, this matter came before the Court for an evidentiary hearing on 
Respondent Murray City Justice Court's Motion to Dismiss the Petitioner's Petition for 
Extraordinary Post-Conviction Relief. Present at the evidentiary hearing were Benjamin Lucero, 
the Petitioner; Heather Brereton, Attorney for Petitioner; Karl Hendrickson, Attorney for Sheriff 
Aaron D. Kennard, Chief Paul Cunningham and the Salt Lake County Jail; Scott Daniels 
Attorney for the Murray Municipal Justice Court and P. Gary Ferrero, Murray Justice Court 
Judge. 
After reviewing the evidence and considering the applicable law, the Court makes the 
following findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Petitioner appeared pro-se throughout the proceedings in the Murray 
Municipal Justice Court. 
2. On two separate occasions, the Petitioner requested his case to be continued so 
that he could retain an attorney; both requests were granted by Judge P. Gary 
Ferrero. 
3. The Petitioner was not new to the criminal justice system because he had some 
previous experience with criminal court proceedings. 
4. The Petitioner viewed the videotape "Rights of Criminal Defendants" narrated by 
Judge Hutchings at his arraignment which specifically explains a defendant's right 
to counsel and that the court can appoint an attorney if the defendant qualifies. 
5. Although not case specific, the proffered testimony of Judge P. Gary Ferrero and 
the affidavits of the Murray Municipal Justice Court clerks indicate that it is Judge 
Ferrero's practice to explain to each defendant his or her right to counsel prior to 
accepting a plea. 
6. The Petitioner read and signed a written rights waiver form which specifically 
indicated that he had the right to counsel and that the Judge could appoint an 
attorney if the defendant was too poor to hire his own attorney. 
7. The written rights waiver form, read and signed by Petitioner, also specified the 
maximum penalties (fines and jail time) for the offense with which he had been 
charged, (DU1) 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. During the proceedings in the Murray Municipal Justice Court, the Petitioner 
understood that he had a right to counsel and if he could not afford an attorney, 
one could be appointed by the Judge. 
2. The Petitioner knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to be represented by an 
attorney when he entered his plea in the Murray Municipal Justice Court. 
ORDER OF THE COURT 
1. It is hereby ordered that Murray City Justice Court's Motion to Dismiss the 
Petitioner's Request for Extraordinary Post-Conviction Relief is granted and the 
Petitioner's Petition for Extraordinary Post-Conviction Relief is thereby 
dismissed. ^ * 
DATED this _Q day of LsTJ-V 2002. 
2 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
GLENN K. IWASAKI 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE, 
V> t'51 
HeatherTJrereton 
Attorney for Petitioner 
"> i£L2 C^cJj Scott Daniels 
Attorney for the Murray Municipal Justice Court 
Karl Hpfidrickson 
Attorrfey for Sheriff Aaron D. Kennard, 
Chief Paul Cunningham and the Salt Lake 
County Jail 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing proposed Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order of the Court was mailed, postage pre-paid to: 
Heather Brereton 
Salt Lake Legal Defender's Association 
Attorneys for Defendant 
424 E. 500 S., Suite #300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Karl L. Hendrickson 
Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office 
2001 South State Street #S3600 
Salt Lake City UT 84190 
Scott Daniels 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 521328 
Salt Lake City UT 84152 
DATED this jCr day of _ 
.:> M _, 2002. 
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee 
v. 
John M. HEATON, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 950238. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
May 1, 1998. 
Defendant was convicted in the District 
Court, Ogden Department, Michael J. Glass-
man, J., of aggravated robbery and evading 
arrest. Defendant appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Russon, J., held that: (1) burden of 
complying with the detainer statute was on 
the prosecutor, not the defendant; (2) delay 
occasioned by court clerk's error did not 
constitute good cause for delay under detain-
er statute; (3) extending trial date to a rea-
sonable time outside detainer statute's 120-
day disposition period to accommodate, in 
part, defense counsel's schedule constituted 
good cause for the delay under the statute; 
and (4) defendant did not knowingly and 
intelligently waive his constitutional right to 
appointed counsel. 
Reversed. 
1. Criminal Law C=>1134(3) 
Denial of defendant's motion to dismiss 
under detainer statute was reviewed for cor-
rectness, where decision was based on legal 
conclusion that clerk's administrative mistake 
could excuse prosecutor's duty to bring 
charges to trial within statutory time limit. 
U.C.A.1953, 77-29-1(1, 3. 4). 
2. Criminal Law G^735 
Whether a waiver of counsel wTas made 
knowingly and intelligently is a mixed ques-
tion of law and fact. 
3. Criminal Law <3=>1134(3) 
Supreme Court reviews trial court's le-
gal determinations for correctness. 
4. Extradition and Detainers <^59 
Burden of complying with the detainer-
statute was on the prosecutor, not the defen-
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dant, and thus, the defendant did not have 
the responsibility to find out why his case 
had not been sent for trial. U.C.A.1953, 77-
29-1. 
5. Extradition and Detainers G=>59 
Even though most of delay in bringing 
defendant to trial was occasioned by court 
clerk's error, this did not constitute good 
cause under detainer statute for delay since 
the prosecutor was not relieved o" its burden 
of complying with the statute. U.C.A.1953, 
77-29-1(1,3,4). 
6. Extradition and Detainers <3=>59 
When a prisoner delivers written notice 
pursuant to detainer statute, prosecutor has 
affirmative duty to have defendant's matter 
heard within statutory period; implicit in this 
duty is duty to notify court that detainer 
notice has been filed and to make good faith 
effort to comply with statute. U.C.A.1953, 
77-29-1(1, 3, 4). 
7. Extradition and Detainers C=>59 
Since the detainer statute places on the 
prosecutor alone the burden of bringing case 
to trial within 120-day period, the prosecu-
tor's duty must be independent of the court's 
docketing system. U.C.A.1953, 77-29-1. 
8. Criminal Law e=>1134(6) 
Even if lower court erred in its legal 
conclusions, Supreme Court may affirm trial 
court's decision on any reasonable legal ba-
sis, provided that any rationale for affir-
mance finds support in the record. 
9. Extradition and Detainers <s=>59 
Deciding whether the district court 
properly denied defendant's motion to dis-
miss pursuant to detainer statute requires 
two-step inquiry: first, Supreme Court must 
determine when the 120-day period com-
menced and when it expired, second, if trial 
wras held outside the 120-day period, Su-
preme Court must then determine whether 
good cause excused the delay. U.C.A.1953, 
77-29-1. 
10. Extradition and Detainers <£=»59 
Detainer statute's 120-day disposition 
period must be extended by amount of time 
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during which prisoner himself creates delay. 
U.C.A.1953, 77-29-1. 
11. Extradition and Detainers <3=>59 
Extending trial date to a reasonable 
time outside detainer statute's 120-day dis-
position period to accommodate, in part, de-
fense counsel's schedule constituted good 
cause for the delay under the statute. 
U.C.A.1953, 77-29-1(3, 4). 
12. Criminal Law ®=>641.4(4), 641.7(1) 
Defendant did not knowingly and intelli-
gently waive his constitutional right to ap-
pointed counsel, even though court refused to 
dismiss defense counsel, recommended that 
defendant rely on counsel during voir dire 
and strongly advised that he allow counsel to 
cross-examine state's witnesses, where trial 
court failed to advise defendant, at a mini-
mum, of dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation, and had already allowed de-
fendant to proceed pro se when warnings 
involving defense counsel were issued. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6. 
13. Criminal Law ^641.4(1) 
Sixth Amendment guarantees an ac-
cused right to self-representation, provided 
only that he knowingly and intelligently for-
goes his right to counsel. U.S.C.A. Const. 
Amend. 6. 
14. Criminal Law <&=>641.4(2) 
When a trial court is confronted with 
defendant who either refuses to proceed to 
trial with appointed counsel or insists on 
proceeding pro se, court must carefully con-
sider defendant's right to self-representation 
with his right to counsel MS.C.A. Const. 
Amend. 6. 
15. Criminal Law <^641.7(1) 
Before trial court may permit defendant 
to proceed without assistance of counsel, 
court must conduct thorough inquiry of de-
fendant to fulfill its duty of insuring that 
defendant's waiver of counsel is knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily made; in making 
this determination, the court must advise 
defendant of dangers and disadvantages of 
self-representation so that the record will 
establish that he knows what he is doing and 
his choice is made with eyes open. U.S.C.A* 
ConstAmend. 6. 
16. Criminal Law <S=>641.7(1) 
In addition to advising defendant of dan-
gers and disadvantages of self-representation 
before permitting defendant to proceed with-
out assistance of counsel, trial court should 
(1) advise defendant of his constitutional 
right to assistance of counsel, as well as his 
constitutional right to represent himself, (2) 
ascertain that defendant possesses intelli-
gence and capacity to understand and appre-
ciate consequences of decision to represent 
himself, including expectation that defendant 
will comply with technical rules and recogni-
tion that presenting defense is not just mat-
ter of telling one's story, and (3) ascertain 
that defettdwrt, ^rapY^hewds, watoe <& 
charges and proceedings, range of permissi-
ble punishments, and any additional facts 
essential to broad understanding of case. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6. 
17. Criminal Law <5=>1139 
In the absence of a colloquy on the 
record between the court and the defendant 
determining the validity of a waiver of coun-
sel, Supreme Court will look at record and 
make de novo determination regarding validi-
ty of defendant's waiver only in extraordi-
nary circumstances, the existence of which 
the Court will address on a case-by-case 
basis. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6. 
Jan Graham, Att'y Gen., Kris Leonard, 
Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff 
ana appeWee. 
Candace S. Bridgess, Kent E. Snider, Og-
den, for defendant and appellant. 
RUSSON, Justice: 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant John M. Heaton appeals a judg-
ment entered on a jury verdict finding him 
guilty of aggravated robbery, a first degree 
felony, and evading arrest, a third degree 
felony. We reverse. 
STATE v. 
Cite as 958 P.2d 
BACKGROUND 
Because some of the dates corresponding 
to the facts in this case are critical to the 
resolution of this appeal, we provide a de-
tailed chronological summary of the relevant 
events. 
On July 13, 1994, Heaton was arrested for 
the robbery of an Albertson's grocery store 
in Roy, Utah. The next day, Heaton waived 
his right to a preliminary hearing and was 
bound over to district court. Heaton was a 
parolee at the time, and on July 26, he was 
returned to the Utah State Prison for violat-
ing his parole. Heaton also qualified for 
public assistance and was appointed counsel 
from the public defender's office. On August 
2, Heaton appeared in district court for ar-
raignment, at which time he pleaded unot 
guilty"' to the charges and the judge set a 
pretrial conference for August 30 and a jury 
trial for September 9. On August 25, while 
incarcerated at the prison, Heaton filed a 
written request for final disposition of all 
matters pending against him pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (the "detainer 
statute"), which requires the prosecutor to 
bring pending charges against a prisoner to 
trial within 120 days from the date the notice 
is delivered to certain state officials or their 
agents. An authorized agent at the prison 
received Heaton's notice on September 3.1 
At his pretrial conference on August 30, 
Heaton requested a preliminary hearing, 
which he had initially waived. The prosecu-
tion had no objection, and the parties and the 
court agreed to hold a preliminary hearing 
on September 9, the date for which the trial 
had initially been set. At the September 9 
preliminary hearing, the court found that 
probable cause existed and set a second ar-
raignment for September 27. At the second 
arraignment, Heaton requested that the 
judge recuse himself on the basis that the 
judge had also presided over Heaton's pre-
liminary hearing. The judge recused himself 
and ordered the case reassigned. However, 
as a result of an error in the district court 
1- The prosecutor's office received the notice on 
September 8 The record does not indicate 
whether the district court received Heaton's de-
tainer notice; however, the prosecutor stated 
that he believed the court probably received the 
notice on September 8, 1994 
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clerk's office, the case was not rea.ssigned. 
In late November 1994, after receiving inqui-
ry by a witness regarding the trial date, the 
prosecutor contacted the district court for a 
status report, whereupon the clerk's office 
discovered the error and reassigned the case 
to a different judge as previously ordered. 
On November 28, the district court sent 
the parties a notice of a trial-scheduling con-
ference set for December 7. At that confer-
ence, the court initially attempted to set the 
trial date for January 19, 1995. However, 
because both defense counsel and the prose-
cutor had a scheduling conflict, the court set 
the trial for the next available date suitable 
for all the parties, February 16 and 17, 1995.2 
Subsequent to the trial-scheduling confer-
ence on December 7, 1994, Heaton sent a 
letter to the court requesting new counsel. 
On February 8, 1995, the court held a hear-
ing to address Heaton's request, which wras 
based in part on his defense counsel's refusal 
to bring a motion to dismiss pursuant to the 
detainer statute. The court denied Heaton's 
request. On February 16, 1995, after reeval-
uating Heaton's claim, Heaton's defense 
counsel moved to dismiss pursuant to the 
detainer statute. The court, however, found 
that at least 60 days of the 71-day delay— 
i.e., the period between the second arraign-
ment and the trial-scheduling conference— 
were attributable to the administrative error 
in the clerk's office. This delay, the court 
concluded, constituted "good cause" under 
the statute, and the court therefore denied 
the motion. 
Although originally scheduled for Febru-
ary 16 and 17, 1995, the trial was not actually 
held until April 20 and 21, 1995.3 Before 
trial, Heaton filed a pro se motion requesting 
that the judge recuse himself and requesting 
new counsel. A hearing was held on April 
19, 1995, and the judge denied both requests. 
During the hearing, Heaton indicated that 
he did not feel he was receiving adequate 
legal representation and that he felt forced to 
2. Defense counsel and the prosecutor were work-
ing on another criminal trial in rnid-Januan 
3. The reasons for the trial delay from February 
to April aie not pertinent to this appeal. 
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proceed on his own. His attorney indicated 
that a "rift" had developed between them, 
that he was uncomfortable going to trial be-
cause of the "total conflict" between them, 
and that he thought Heaton wanted to repre-
sent himself. Heaton did not assert his right 
to self-representation, and the judge did not 
ask Heaton whether he wished to waive his 
right to counsel. Instead, the judge (1) ad-
vised Heaton of his right to self-representa-
tion, (2) refused to permit Heaton's counsel 
to withdraw, (3) indicated to Heaton that he 
was requiring counsel to remain as standby 
counsel to assist Heaton if he wanted the 
assistance, and (4) indicated that Heaton was 
free to choose to handle trial matters on his 
own but that the court would make a record 
of Heaton's decision to proceed pro se. 
Although Heaton's defense counsel assist-
ed Heaton in selecting the jury, Heaton rep-
resented himself at trial. The jury convicted 
Heaton on both charges, and he was sen-
tenced to serve concurrent terms of five 
years to life and zero to five years at the 
Utah State Prison, such terms to be served 
consecutively to any sentences Heaton was 
already serving. 
On appeal, Heaton alleges the following 
errors: (1) the trial court erred in denying 
his motion to dismiss pursuant to the detain-
er statute; (2) he was denied his constitution-
al right to counsel; (3) he was denied his 
constitutional right to effective assistance of 
counsel; and (4) the prosecutor's misconduct 
during closing argument constituted revers-
ible error. 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
[1] The trial court's decision to deny 
Heaton's motion to dismiss was based on its 
legal conclusion that under the detainer stat-
ute the clerk's administrative mistake could 
excuse the prosecutor's duty to bring Hea-
ton's charges to trial within the 120-day peri-
od. Because this is a legal, rather than a 
factual, conclusion, we review the trial court's 
decision for correctness. See State v. Peter-
sen, 810 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 1991). 
[2,3] Whether a waiver of counsel was 
made knowingly and intelligently is a mixed 
question of law and fact. We review the trial 
court's legal determinations for correctness* 
See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 937-39 
(Utah 1994); Harding v. Lewis, 834 F2d 
853, 857 (9th Cir.1987). 
ANALYSIS 
[4] Heaton first argues that the trial 
court erred in denying his motion to dismiss 
pursuant to the detainer statute. That stat* 
ute provides, in relevant part: 
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a 
term of imprisonment in the state prison, 
jail or other penal or correctional institu-
tion of this state, and there is pending 
against the prisoner in this state any un-
tried indictment or information, and the 
prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sher-
iff or custodial officer in authority, or any 
appropriate agent of the same, a written 
demand specifying the nature of the 
charge and the court wherein it is pending 
and requesting disposition of the pending 
charge, he shall be entitled to have the 
charge brought to trial within 120 days of 
the date of delivery of written notice. 
(3) After written demand is delivered as 
required in Subsection (1), the prosecuting 
attorney or the defendant or his counsel, 
for good cause shown in open court, with 
the prisoner or his counsel being present, 
may be granted any reasonable continu-
ance. 
(4) In the event the charge is not 
brought to trial within 120 days, or within 
such continuance as has been granted, and 
defendant or his counsel moves to dismiss 
the action, the court shall review the pro-
ceeding. If the court finds that the failure 
of the prosecuting attorney to have the 
matter heard within the time required is 
not supported by good cause, whether a 
previous motion for continuance was 
made or not, the court shall order the 
matter dismissed with prejudice. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(1), (3), & (4) (em-
phasis added). 
In denying Heaton's motion to dismiss, the 
district court made the following ruling: 
[T]his Court is going to deny the Defen-
dant's [motion onl the basis that I believe 
STATE v. 
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that there has been good cause[.] And 
that term doesn't quite fit in this situation, 
but explainable cause shown as to why the 
delay occurred. And the Court does not 
find in any way that it was as a result of 
the prosecution's dragging its feet. 
The facts are that the bulk of the delay, 
60 days at least of it, was the fault proba-
bly of the Clerk's office in this case. And 
again I don't know whether that fits into 
what could be called a good cause shown, 
but the Court believes that it happens 
from time to time, that there can be that 
kind of a glitch. 
And certainly the Defendant could have 
pushed to find out why his case had not 
been set for trial. [He] [c]ould have 
pushed his counsel to make that request, 
[a]nd was in the same position [as was] the 
State . . . . 
The case sat. And it is unfortunate it 
did, but the Court will deny the motion at 
this time. 
The district court's ruling contradicts sec-
tion 77-29-1 and our prior case law. The 
statute requires the prosecutor "to have the 
matter heard within the time required." 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(4). Moreover, 
this court has consistently held that the lan-
guage of the detainer statute clearly places 
the burden of complying with the statute on 
the prosecutor. See Petersen, 810 P.2d at 
424; State v. Wilson, 22 Utah 2d 361, 453 
P.2d 158, 160 (1969). In Petersen, the trial 
court asked the defendant whether the trial 
date was acceptable, and the defendant did 
not object to the date, which was outside the 
120-day period. Nevertheless, this court 
concluded that the defendant was not re-
quired to object to the trial date in order to 
maintain his rights under the statute because 
the burden of bringing the case to trial with-
in the disposition period rested solely with 
the prosecution. 810 P.2d at 424. Thus, in 
the case at bar, the court clearly erred in 
concluding that Heaton was in the same posi-
tion as was the State and therefore shared 
some of the responsibility to find out why his 
case had not been set for trial. 
[5] The trial court further erred in its 
legal conclusion that the 71-day delay, most 
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of which was occasioned by the court clerk's 
error, constituted "good cause" and thereby 
relieved the prosecutor of its burden under 
the statute. We first note that the judge's 
finding that the State did not contribute to 
the delay carries little significance. The 
mere fact that the delay was not caused by 
the prosecutor has never been considered 
dispositive because "to hold that good cause 
is supported by the lone fact that the delay 
was not caused by the prosecutor would con-
tradict the language in section 77-29-1(4) 
which places the burden of complying with 
the statute on the prosecution." Id. at 426; 
see also Wilson, 453 P.2d at 159-60 (revers-
ing trial court's decision not to dismiss, not-
withstanding fact that prosecution did not 
cause delay). 
[6, 7] The State argues that while it could 
have followed up on the case earlier, "defen-
dant cites no precedent for attributing to the 
prosecutor the responsibility for anticipating 
or preventing unexpected and infrequent ad-
ministrative mistakes made by court person-
nel." We agree with the State that it is not 
responsible for the administrative mistakes 
of the court. Nevertheless, it is responsible 
for complying with section 77-29-1. Because 
the statute places on the prosecutor alone 
the burden of bringing the case to trial with-
in the 120-day period, the prosecutor's duty 
must be independent of the court's docketing 
system. While Heaton's case fell victim to 
an administrative "glitch" at the clerk's of-
fice, his case also fell through a crack in the 
prosecutor's office. Even though the prose-
cutor's office received Heaton's detainer no-
tice on September 8, 1994, neither the briefs 
nor our review of the record indicates that 
the prosecutor even addressed Heaton's de-
tainer notice to the court until February 16, 
1995, after the disposition period had already 
expired. When a prisoner delivers a written 
notice pursuant to the detainer statute, the 
prosecutor has an affirmative duty to have 
the defendant's matter heard within the stat-
utory period. Implicit in this duty is the 
duty to notify the court that a detainer notice 
has been filed and to make a good faith effort 
to comply with the statute. This is not to 
say that the prosecutor must succeed, for 
"good cause" may support the prosecutor's 
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failure to comply. However, where the pros-
ecutor's failure is inaction—in this case, do-
ing nothing whatsoever to bring Heaton's 
case to trial within the statutory period—the 
trial court may not conclude that the prose-
cutor's failure is supported by "good cause." 
[8,9] Nevertheless, even if the lower 
court erred in its legal conclusions, this court 
may affirm a trial court's decision on any 
reasonable legal basis, provided that any ra-
tionale for affirmance finds support in the 
record. See K & T, Inc. v. Koroulis, 888 
P.2d 623, 628 (Utah 1994); Hill v. Seattle 
First Nat'l Bank, 827 P.2d 241, 246 (Utah 
1992). Deciding whether the district court 
properly denied Heaton's motion to dismiss 
pursuant to the detainer statute requires a 
two-step inquiry. First, we must determine 
when the 120-day period commenced and 
when it expired. Second, if the trial was 
held outside the 120-day period, we must 
then determine whether "good cause" ex-
cused the delay. 
[10] The detainer statute clearly provides 
that the 120-day period commences on the 
date the written notice is delivered "to the 
warden, sheriff or custodial officer in authori-
ty, or any appropriate agent of the same." 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(1); see also State 
v. Viles, 702 P.2d 1175, 1176 (Utah 1985) 
(holding that 120-day disposition period com-
mences from date of delivery of written no-
tice to warden, not from date defense counsel 
files notice of appearance). However, this 
court has held that when a prisoner himself 
acts to delay the trial, he indicates his will-
ingness to temporarily waive his right to a 
speedy trial. Thus, the disposition period 
must be extended by the amount of time 
during which the prisoner himself creates the 
delay. See State v. Velasquez, 641 P.2d 115, 
116 (Utah 1982) (concluding that where de-
fendant's trial date was originally scheduled 
less than one month after defendant's re-
quest for disposition and court granted de-
fendant's request for continuance defendant 
was responsible for number of days during 
which continuance was granted and could not 
include those days in disposition period). 
In the case at bar, the 120-day disposition 
period commenced on September 3, 1994, 
because that is the date on which an autho-
rized agent at the prison received Heaton'* 
written notice. However, Heaton did cause a 
trial delay. As set forth above, the court 
initially scheduled trial for September 9 
1994. At his pretrial conference on August 
30, Heaton requested a preliminary hearing, 
which he had initially waived. The prosecu-
tor having no objection, the court granted 
Heaton's request, changing the trial date to 
the preliminary hearing date. But for Hea-
ton's request for a preliminary hearing, his 
case would have been brought to trial on 
September 9, just 6 days after his written 
notice had been delivered. Thus, Heaton 
delayed his own trial and indicated his will-
ingness to temporarily waive his rights under 
the detainer statute. See Velasquez, 641 
P.2d at 116. 
When the court changed Heaton's trial 
date to the preliminary hearing date, in ef-
fect it continued Heaton's trial pending the 
outcome of the preliminary hearing. Had 
the court not found probable cause at the 
hearing, it would have had to dismiss the 
charges. See Utah R.Crim.P. 7(h)(3). How-
ever, the court did find probable cause and 
therefore scheduled a second arraignment 
for September 27. The court could not set a 
new trial date until Heaton entered his pleas 
at the second arraignment. Thus, because 
Heaton's trial date was continued for the 
purpose of accommodating his request for a 
preliminary hearing, and because a new trial 
date could not even have been considered 
until the second arraignment, Heaton may 
not include the 18 days between September 9 
and September 27 as part of the 120-day 
disposition period. 
Excluding the 18-day delay attributable to 
Heaton, the State had until January 19, 1995, 
to bring Heaton to trial. Although the court 
initially attempted to set the trial for Janu-
ary 19, 1995, it scheduled the trial beyond 
the disposition period because of the defense 
counsel's and prosecutor's scheduling con-
flict. Therefore, we must proceed to step 
two of our inquiry to determine whether 
continuing the trial to accommodate, in part, 
defense counsel's schedule constitutes "good 
cause" under section 77-29-1. 
STATE v. 
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[11J A nearly identical issue was raised in 
State v. Bonny, 25 Utah 2d 117, 477 P.2d 147 
(1970), wTherein the initially scheduled trial 
date fell within the disposition period, but 
because defense counsel had a scheduling 
conflict the court rescheduled the trial for 
five days beyond the disposition period. 
This court concluded that section 77-65-1, 
the predecessor to section 77-29-1,4 permit-
ted the court to grant " *for a good cause 
shown in open court . . . any necessary or 
reasonable continuance.'" Bonny, 411 P.2d 
at 147-48 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 77-65-
1). Thus, because the trial was rescheduled 
at defense counsel's request and to accommo-
date his schedule, this court held that the 
trial court had authority to grant such a 
continuance, which was "entirely reasonable 
and practical under the circumstances." Id. 
at 148. 
Because section 77-29-1(3) contains sub-
stantially the same language as section 77-
65-1 and gives the court discretion to grant 
continuances, the reasoning in Bonny is ap-
plicable to the case at bar. The January 19, 
1995, date initially offered by the trial court 
fell within the 120-day disposition period, 
and the court was therefore within its au-
thority to grant a reasonable continuance 
under section 77-29-1(3) to accommodate de-
fense counsel's schedule. In light of the 
other criminal trial both defense counsel and 
the prosecutor were engaged in, setting Hea-
ton's trial one month beyond the disposition 
period was not unreasonable. Therefore, we 
hold that while the district court erred in its 
legal conclusions, extending the trial date to 
a reasonable time outside the disposition pe-
riod to accommodate, in part, defense coun-
sel's schedule constitutes "good cause" under 
section 77-29-1(3) and (4), and the trial court 
correctly denied Heaton's motion to dismiss. 
[12,131 We next address Heaton's argu-
ment that he did not knowingly and intelli-
gently waive his constitutional right to ap-
pointed counsel. The Sixth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution guarantees an 
accused the right to the assistance of counsel. 
See Gideon v. Wainurright, 372 U.S. 335, 
342-44, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963); 
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63, 58 
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S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). If an ac-
cused is indigent, he is entitled to court-
appointed counsel. See State v. Wuljfen-
stein, 733 P.2d 120, 121 (Utah 1986). How-
ever, the Sixth Amendment also guarantees 
an accused the right to self-representation, 
"provided only that he [or she] knowingly 
and intelligently forgoes his [or her] right to 
counsel." McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 
168, 173, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 
(1984); see also Faretta v. California, 422 
U.S. 806, 807, 818, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 
562(1975). 
The right to have the assistance of counsel 
in a criminal trial is a fundamental constitu-
tional right which must be jealously protect-
ed by the trial court. The United States 
Supreme Court has stated: 
The constitutional right of an accused to be 
represented by counsel invokes, of itself, 
the protection of a trial court, in which the 
accused—whose life or liberty is at stake— 
is without counsel. This protecting duty 
imposes the serious and weighty responsi-
bility upon the tncd judge of determining 
whether there is an intelligent and compe-
tent waiver by the accused. 
Johnson, 304 U.S. at 465, 58 S.Ct. 1019 (em-
phasis added). Because of the importance of 
the right to counsel and the heavy burden 
placed upon the trial court to protect this 
right, there is a presumption against waiver, 
and doubts concerning waiver must be re-
solved in the defendant's favor. See, e.g., 
Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019 
("'[Cjourts indulge every reasonable pre-
sumption against waiver' of fundamental con-
stitutional rights." (quoting Aetna Ins. Co. 
v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393, 57 S.Ct. 809, 
81 L.Ed. 1177 (1937))); United States v. Wil-
liamson, 806 F.2d 216, 220 (10th Cir.1986) 
(doubts concerning waiver of counsel must be 
resolved in defendant's favor). 
[14-16] When a trial court is confronted 
with a defendant who either refuses to pro-
ceed to trial with appointed counsel or insists 
on proceeding pro se, the court must careful-
ly consider the defendant's right to self-rep-
resentation with his right to counsel. Never-
theless, before the court may permit the 
4. Sect ion 7 7 - 2 9 - 1 , enacted in 1980, replaced section 77-to5-1. 
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defendant to proceed without the assistance 
of counsel, the court must conduct a thor-
ough inquiry of the defendant to fulfill its 
duty of insuring that the defendant's waiver 
of counsel is knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily made. In making this determina-
tion, the court must advise the defendant of 
the dangers and disadvantages of self-repre-
sentation "so that the record will establish 
that 'he knows what he is doing and his 
choice is made with eyes open.'" Faretta, 
422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct 2525 (quoting 
Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 
U.S. 269, 279, 63 S.Ct. 236, 87 L.Ed. 268 
(1942)); see Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 
708, 723-24, 68 S.Ct. 316, 92 L.Ed. 309 
(1948); State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 
187-88 (Utah 1987). In addition, the trial 
court should (1) advise the defendant of his 
constitutional right to the assistance of coun-
sel, as well as his constitutional right to 
represent himself; (2) ascertain that the de-
fendant possesses the intelligence and capaci-
ty to understand and appreciate the conse-
quences of the decision to represent himself, 
including the expectation that the defendant 
will comply with technical rules and the rec-
ognition that presenting a defense is not just 
a matter of telling one's story; and (3) ascer-
tain that the defendant comprehends the na-
ture of the charges and proceedings, the 
range of permissible punishments, and any 
additional facts essential to a broad under-
standing of the case. See State v. Frye, 224 
Conn. 253, 617 A.2d 1382, 1386-87 (1992); see 
also Frampton, 737 P.2d at 187-88.5 
This court stated in Frampton that a collo-
quy on the record between the court and the 
defendant is the preferred method of deter-
mining the validity of a waiver of counsel. 
Frampton, 737 P.2d at 187. The reasoning 
behind this conclusion is that the information 
necessary for the court to make its determi-
nation generally "can only be elicited after 
penetrating questioning by the trial court." 
Id.; see also Von Moltke, 332 U.S. at 724, 68 
S.Ct. 316 ("A judge can make certain that an 
5. In Frampton, as a guide for trial courts, this 
court quoted a sixteen-point colloquy recom-
mended to the federal courts lor use when con-
fronting a prospective pro se defendant Framp-
ton, 737 P 2d at 187-88 n 12 (citing Bench Book 
for United States District Court Judges, vol 1, 
accused's professed waiver of counsel is*l|| 
derstandingly and wisely made only frnwM 
penetrating and comprehensive examiniSi 
of all the circumstances."). In Framptor^M 
also stated that in the absence of suchS 
colloquy, we will look at any evidence irigyj 
record to determine whether the particidil 
facts and circumstances support a valid wft||| 
er. 737 P.2d at 188. 
[17] However, in light of the foregdBK 
discussion, this court is reluctant to assiiSJj 
the important responsibility which has b&j£ 
placed upon the trial court. After all, 4^1* 
trial court—having the benefit of question™ 
the defendant and observing his demeanor-Si 
is in the best position to determine whethle^ 
the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and to* 
telligently waived his right to counsel IS 
contrast, this court's proper role is to revie^ 
the trial court's findings and conclusions and 
then determine whether the trial court corf 
rectly concluded that the defendant validljr 
waived counsel. A meaningful review of the 
trial court can take place only after that 
court has conducted a meaningful inquiry of 
the defendant. Therefore, in the absence of 
such a colloquy, this court will look at the 
record and make a de novo determination 
regarding the validity of the defendants 
waiver only in extraordinary circumstances, 
the existence of which we will address on * 
case-by-case basis. See Harding, 834 F.2d 
at 857. 
In the case at bar, the trial court clearly 
did not advise Heaton of the dangers and 
disadvantages of self-representation. The 
day before trial, during the hearing address-
ing Heaton's motion for new counsel, the trial 
judge stated: 
Now, with respect to counsel, you do 
have the right to represent yourself. I am 
not going to allow Mr. Caine's withdrawal 
at this point. Mr. Caine is a capable de-
fense attorney. He is very familiar with 
the facts in your case. I am going to 
require that he remain on as counsel to 
assist you if you want the assistance. 
§§ l 02-2 to -5 (Federal Judicial Center, 3d ed. 
1986)) Once again, we stronglv recommend 
that trial courts use that approach, as it is an 
effective means by which to determine whether 
the defendant has validly waived his right to 
counsel 
FACER v 
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Mr. Heaton, if during the process of the 
Jury selection, and the defense that you 
want to present during the trial, you want 
to handle that on your own, you are free to 
do that. And you will be making that 
decision as you go. We will make a record 
of your decision to handle those matters on 
vour own if that's your choice. 
My recommendation to you is that you 
rely on Mr. Caine's expertise and experi-
ence and have him help you. But you can 
make that choice. 
The court's cursory recommendation to 
Heaton to rely on defense counsel did not 
apprise Heaton in any way of the constitu-
tional significance of the right to counsel and 
the consequences of waiver. The State ar-
gues that Heaton should have been aware of 
the dangers and disadvantages of self-repre-
sentation because on the day of trial, after 
the jury had been selected, the court strong-
ly advised Heaton to allow defense counsel to 
cross-examine the State's witnesses inasmuch 
as Heaton would certainly not be as effective 
as defense counsel. While the court's advice 
was certainly appropriate, it addressed only 
one of the disadvantages of self-representa-
tion—i.e., not having experience and exper-
tise in cross-examining witnesses. More-
over, the trial court had already determined 
that Heaton had decided to represent him-
self. As we have previously mentioned, be-
fore a trial court may permit a defendant to 
proceed pro se, the court must determine 
whether the defendant competently waived 
counsel at the time of waiver, not after. 
We therefore hold that because the trial 
court failed to advise Heaton, at a minimum, 
of the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation, Heaton did not validly waive 
his constitutional right to counsel. The trial 
court erred in permitting Heaton to proceed 
pro se, and Heaton is entitled to a new trial. 
There are no extraordinary circumstances in 
this case which would justify our examination 
of the record and making a de novo determi-
nation as to whether Heaton knowingly and 
intelligently waived his right to counsel. 
Moreover, because the waiver of counsel is-
sue is dispositive of this appeal, we need not 
address Heaton's other arguments. 
ALLEN Utah 919 
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We reverse Heaton's convictions and order 
a new trial. 
HOWE, C.J., DURHAM, .Associate C.J., 
and STEWART and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., 
concur in Justice RUSSON's opinion. 
KErNUMBtP^STEM/ 
Lorin FACER, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
R. Lee ALLEN, Allen L. Jensen, James 
J. White, and Box Elder County, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
No. 960463. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
May 12, 199b. 
Former justice court judge brought ac-
tion alleging county commission's pre-elec-
tion elimination of his precinct violated statu-
tory prohibition against abolishing precincts 
within 90 days of an election. The First Dis-
trict Court, Box Elder County, Ben H. Had-
field, J., granted summary judgment in favor 
of county, and former judge appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Howe, C.J., held that: (lj 
statutory prohibition against pre-election 
changes applied to precinct in which justice 
court judge served, and (2) county commis-
sion violated statutory prohibition against 
pre-election changes when it combined two 
precincts 62 days prior to election, even 
though combination was not to take effect 
until over two months after election. 
Reversed. 
1. Appeal and Error C=>842(1) 
Interpretation of statutes poses a ques-
tion of law, which Supreme Court reviews for 
correctness and without deference to the low-
er court's conclusions. 
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MURRAY MUNICIPAL JUSTICE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MURRAY CITY vs. BENJAMIN F LUCERO 
CASE NUMBER 015003617 Misdemeanor DUI 
CHARGES 
Charge 1 - 41-6-44 - DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALC/DRUGS 
Class B Misdemeanor Plea: June 14, 2001 Not Guilty 
Disposition: April 29, 2002 Guilty Plea 
Charge 2 - 41-6-61 - IMPROPER USAGE OF LANES 
Class C Misdemeanor Plea: June 14, 2 001 Not Guilty 
Disposition: April 29, 2002 Dismissed 
CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
GARY FERRERO 
PARTIES 
Defendant - BENJAMIN F LUCERO 
4769 S 4620 W 
KEARNS, UT 84118 
Plaintiff - MURRAY CITY 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Defendant Name: BENJAMIN F LUCERO 
Date of Birth: May 15, 1947 
Social Security Number: 528606706 
Driver License Number: 6842620 
Driver License State: UT 
Law Enforcement Agency: UHP - SALT LAKE 
Prosecuting Agency: MURRAY CITY 
Citation Number: 351464 
Violation Date: March 17, 2001 5300 S 600 W 
ACCOUNT SUMMARY 
TOTAL REVENUE Amount Due 
Amount Paid-
Credit 
Balance 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: FID 
Amount Due 
Amount Paid 
Amount Credit 
OE 
1,850.00 
0.00 
0.00 
1,850.00 
1,850.00 
0.00 
0.00 
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CASE NUMBER 015003617 Misdemeanor DUI 
Balance: 1,850.00 
PROCEEDINGS 
03-26-01 Filed: ORR Agreement . kgallegc 
04-05-01 ARRAIGNMENT scheduled on June 14, 2001 at 08:30 AM in Murray 
Justice Court with Judge FERRERO. abeardei 
04-05-01 Notice - NOTICE for Case 015003617 ID 51436 abearde] 
ARRAIGNMENT is scheduled. 
Date: 06/14/2001 
Time: 08:30 a.m. 
Location: Murray Justice Court 
688 East Vine Street 
Telephone: 284-4280 
Murray, UT 84107 
Failure to appear may result in a warrant being issued for your 
arrest 
04-05-01 Filed: Citation abearde 
04-05-01 Judge FERRERO assigned. abearde 
06-14-01 PRETRIAL CONFERENCE scheduled on July 20, 2001 at 09:30 AM in 
Murray Justice Court with Judge FERRERO. gkittel 
06-14-01 Minute Entry - Minutes for Arraignment gkittel 
Judge: GARY FERRERO 
PRESENT 
Clerk: gkittel 
Defendant 
Defendant pro se 
ARRAIGNMENT 
Advised of rights and penalties. 
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE is scheduled. 
Date: 07/20/2001 
Time: 09:30 a.m. 
Location: Murray Justice Court 
688 East Vine Street 
Telephone: 284-4280 
Murray, UT 84107 
07-20-01 PRETRIAL CONFERENCE scheduled on October 26, 2001 at 09:30 AM 
in Murray Justice Court with Judge FERRERO. kolsen 
07-20-01 Minute Entry - Pretrial Conference continued kolsen 
Judge: GARY FERRERO 
PRESENT 
Clerk: kolsen 
Prosecutor: BROWER, BRIAN 
Defendant 
Defendant pro se 
Printed: 06/26/02 10:35:05 Page 2 
CASE NUMBER 015003617 Misdemeanor DUI 
CONTINUANCE 
The Defendant has made a motion for continuance of Pretrial 
Conference. 
The motion is granted. 
Reason for continuance: 
Will look into retaining private counsel 
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE is scheduled. 
Date: 10/26/2001 
Time: 09:30 a.m. 
Location: Murray Justice Court 
688 East Vine Street 
Telephone: 284-4280 
Murray, UT 84107 
07-20-01 PRETRIAL CONFERENCE Continued. kolsen 
10-26-01 PRETRIAL CONFERENCE scheduled on January 02, 2002 at 01:30 PM 
in Murray Justice Court with Judge FERRERO. kolsen 
10-26-01 Minute Entry - Pretrial Conference continued kolsen 
Judge: GARY FERRERO 
PRESENT 
Clerk: kolsen 
Prosecutor: BROWER, BRIAN 
Defendant 
Defendant pro se 
CONTINUANCE 
The Defendant has made a motion for continuance of Pretrial 
Conference. 
The motion is granted. 
Reason for continuance: 
Retaining private counsel 
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE is scheduled. 
Date: 01/02/2002 
Time: 01:30 p.m. 
Location: Murray Justice Court 
688 East Vine Street 
Telephone: 284-4280 
Murray, UT 84107 
10-26-01 PRETRIAL CONFERENCE Continued. 
01-02-02 BENCH TRIAL scheduled on April 29, 2002 at 01:30 PM in Murray 
Justice Court with Judge FERRERO. kolsen 
01-02-02 Minute Entry - Minutes for PRETRIAL kolsen 
Judge: GARY FERRERO 
PRESENT 
Clerk: kolsen 
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CASE NUMBER 015003617 Misdemeanor DUI 
Prosecutor: BROWER, BRIAN 
Defendant 
Defendant pro se 
HEARING 
Case set over for a Bench Trial. 
BENCH TRIAL is scheduled. 
Date: 04/29/2002 
Time: 01:30 p.m. 
Location: Murray Justice Court 
688 East Vine Street 
Telephone: 284-4280 
Murray, UT 84107 
02-14-02 Filed: letter from Patty Collett ccamp 
02-15-02 Note: cc/gf: In respone to the letter filed 2/14, Court advises 
Patty Collett to file a report regarding concerns w/ the 
defendant to the appropriate Law Enforcement Agency. ccamp 
04-24-02 Note: BENJAMIN F LUCERO called to inform the court that he 
would like to just pay fine instead of trial. Def. will call 
the city to inform them of his decission. cherylc 
04-29-02 SENTENCING scheduled on June 04, 2002 at 10:30 AM in Murray 
Justice Court with Judge FERRERO. kolsen 
04-29-02 Filed: DUI rights waiver/enhancment kolsen 
04-29-02 Minute Entry - Minutes for Bench Trial kolsen 
Judge: GARY FERRERO 
PRESENT 
Clerk: kolsen 
Prosecutor: CRITCHFIELD, GL 
Defendant 
Defendant pro se 
The Information is read. 
Court advises defendant of rights and penalties. 
A pre-sentence investigation was ordered. 
The Judge orders Intermountain Substance Abuse to prepare a 
Pre-sentence report. 
TRIAL 
Case has been resolved. Deft pled guilty to count I. Upon motion 
from the city court orders count II dismissed. 
SENTENCING is scheduled. 
Date: 06/04/2002 
Time: 10:30 a.m. 
Location: Murray Justice Court 
688 East Vine Street 
Telephone: 284-4280 
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CASE NUMBER 015003617 Misdemeanor DUI 
Murray, UT 84107 
05-23-02 Filed: ISA Presentence Report gkittel 
06-03-02 Filed: ISA/PSR cherylc 
06-04-02 Filed: ISA Presentence Report gkittel 
06-04-02 REVIEW HEARING scheduled on September 05, 2002 at 01:30 PM in 
Murray Justice Court with Judge FERRERO. gkittel 
06-04-02 Tracking started for Probation. Review date Dec 04, 2003. gkittel 
06-04-02 Tracking started for Fine. Review date Sep 05, 2002. gkittel 
06-04-02 Filed order: FORTHWITH (180 DAYS) gkittel 
Judge gferrero 
Signed June 04, 2002 
06-04-02 Fine Account created Total Due: 1850.00 gkittel 
06-04-02 Minute Entry - Minutes for SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITME gkittel 
Judge: GARY FERRERO 
PRESENT 
Clerk: gkittel 
Defendant 
Defendant pro se 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE 
OF ALC/DRUGS a Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a 
term of 180 day(s) 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 Fine: $1850.00 
Suspended: $0.00 
Surcharge: $855.41 
Due: $1850.00 
Total Fine: $1850.00 
Total Suspended: $0 
Total Surcharge: $855.41 
Total Amount Due: $1850.00 
The fine is to be paid in full by 09/05/2002. 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 18 month(s) . 
Probation is to be supervised by Murray Municipal Justice Court. 
Defendant to serve 180 day(s) jail. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 1850.00 which includes the surcharge. 
Pay fine on or before September 5, 2002. 
Pay fine to The Court. 
Printed: 06/26/02 10:35:08 Page 5 
CASE NUMBER 015003617 Misdemeanor DUI 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
NO FURTHER VIOLATIONS 
NO CONSUMPTION OF ALCOHOL 
RETURN TO COURT FOR REVIEW(S) 
NO USE OF NON-PRESCRIBED CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES 
IOP PROGRAM THROUGH ISA AFTER RELEASE FROM JAIL 
IGNITION INTERLOCK INSTALLED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF RELEASE FROM JAIL 
(COURT FINDS DEF. IMPECUNIOUS) 
REVIEW HEARING is scheduled. 
Date: 09/05/2002 
Time: 01:30 p.m. 
Location: Murray Justice Court 
688 East Vine Street 
Telephone: 284-4280 
Murray, UT 84107 
Printed: 06/26/02 10:35:08 Page 6 (last) 
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" EXHIBIT ONE" 
BRIAN E. BROWER, UBN 8486 
MURRAY CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
5025 S. STATE ST. 
P.O. BOX 57520 
MURRAY, UTAH 84157-0520 
TELEPHONE: (801) 264-2642 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
BENJAMIN FRANK LUCERO, 
Petitioner/Defendant 
vs. 
SHERIFF AARON D. KENNARD; CHIEF 
PAUL CUNNINGHAM; SALT LAKE 
COUNTY JAIL; MURRAY CITY 
JUSTICE COURT, 
Respondents/Plaintiff. 
AFFIDAVIT OF MS. GWEN KITTEL 
SUPPORTING MURRAY CITY'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS PETITIONER'S 
REQUEST FOR EXTRAORDINARY 
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
Civil Case No. 020907208 
Judge: GLENN K. IWASAKI 
At all times herein mentioned, the affiant, Ms. Gwen Kittel, avers the following: 
1. I am one of the two in-court clerks assigned to handle arraignment calendars in the 
Murray City Municipal Justice Court for Judge P. Gary Ferrero. 
2. That prior to every arraignment, Judge Ferrero confirms that each defendant has 
watched the "Rights of Criminal Defendants" video narrated by Judge Hutchings. 
3. That after confirming each defendant has seen the video explaining a defendant's 
rights at the arraignment hearing, Judge Ferrero orally advises each defendant of their 
rights, including their right to be represented by an attorney before he asks the defendant 
how they wish to plead. 
4. That I was the in-court clerk for Mr. Benjamin Lucero's arraignment hearing on case 
number 015003617 in the Murray Municipal Justice Court which took place on June 14, 
2001. 
5. That based on my review of the minute entries made by myself during Mr. Lucero's 
arraignment hearing as well as my experience observing thousands of arraignments 
performed by Judge Ferrero, it is my convincing belief that Judge Ferrero informed Mr. 
Lucero of his constitutional rights, including his right to be represented by an attorney and 
that if he could not afford to hire his own attorney, that one could be appointed for him 
free of charge. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED thiss2lday of U^^%K^Jz^ . ^~OQ^ 
Ms. Gwen Kittel, Affiant 
Murray City Justice Court Clerk 
STATE OF UTAH 
:ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the P\^\ day oin^X^\ , 2002, Ms. Gwen Kittel appeared before me, signer of 
the foregoing document, who duly acknowledged to me that she executed the same. 
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TRANSCRIPT OF JUDGE HUTCHINGS VIDEOTAPE 
My name is Mike Hutchings. I am a judge in Salt Lake County. 
I have been asked to tell you about your rights. 
If you are charged with a misdemeanor or an infraction, it is 
important that you listen carefully so that you will understand 
your rights before you talk to the judge today. The judge today 
will tell you about the misdemeanors or infractions that you are 
charged with committing. The judge will ask you to enter a plea of 
guilty, not guilty or no contest. I will now explain what each of 
these pleas means. 
A plea of no contest means that you are not going to fight or 
challenge the charges that are brought against you. A no contest 
plea carries the same penalties as a guilty plea, but it means that 
you are not admitting that you are guilty. If you enter a plea of 
no contest, the judge may still sentence you to pay a fine, serve 
a jail term, perform community service work, pay restitution to a 
victim, or be on probation. 
A plea of not guilty means that you are fighting or 
challenging the charges brought against you. If you plead not 
guilty, the judge will order that you come back another day for a 
trial or for a pretrial settlement conference. 
If you plead guilty, you are admitting that the charges 
against you are true. If you plead guilty, the judge will make a 
decision about whether to order that you pay a fine, serve a jail 
term, perform some community service work, pay restitution to a 
victim, or be placed on probation. 
If you enter a plea of guilty or a plea of no contest, you can 
ask the judge to sentence you today. However, you have the right 
to come back and be sentenced between two and thirty days from 
today's date. Before the judge decides on your sentence, you may 
speak to the judge and make an explanation and tell the judge 
anything that you want the judge to know about you or your 
circumstances. 
If you plead guilty or no contest, you will not have a trial 
and you will be giving up or waiving certain rights. These rights 
are: 
The right to have a speedy public trial; 
The right to have a jury of persons who live in this 
county hear your case and decide if you are guilty or not 
guilty; 
Also, the right to ask the judge to hear your case 
without a jury and decide if you are guilty or not 
guilty; 
The right to testify at your own trial, and you may tell 
the judge or jury about your case at your trial; 
The right to remain silent at your own trial. No one can 
make you testify at your own trial if you don't want to 
testify, and no inference either of guilt or innocence 
can be made because of your decision not to testify; 
The right to be proven guilty of each charge beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The prosecutor must prove that you are 
guilty and must convince the judge or the jury that 
here's your case, that you are guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. If the prosecutor fails to convince the judge or 
the jury of your guilt, then you will be found not 
guilty; 
The right to confront and cross-examine in open court all 
of the witnesses which the prosecution calls to testify 
against you; 
2 
The right to have your witnesses subpoenaed, at the 
prosecution's expense, to come to your trial and testify 
about your case. Even if the witnesses do not want to 
testify, the judge can order them to come to the trial 
and testify; 
The right to appeal the decisions of the judge or the 
jury; 
Also, the right to hire your own lawyer to represent you. 
If you will be hiring your own lawyer, please tell the 
judge today. If you want to have a lawyer represent you 
and if you do not have the money to hire one, you can ask 
the judge to appoint a public defender. You will need to 
tell the judge about your financial situation, and the 
judge will decide if you qualify for a public defender. 
If you plead guilty or no contest and later wish to withdraw 
your plea, you must file a motion to withdraw your plea in court 
within thirty days. 
Your decision to plead guilty, not guilty or no contest is 
your own personal decision. It is a decision that only you should 
make. You should not plead guilty or no contest if you are now 
under the influence of alcohol or drugs. You should also not plead 
guilty if anyone has made any threats against you or has promised 
you anything in return for your pleas of guilty or no contest. 
I will now tell you about the different classifications of 
crimes and the potential punishments associated with each. 
If you are charged with a class A misdemeanor, the judge could 
order you to pay a fine of up to $4,625 and also to serve a jail 
term of up to one year. If you are charged with a class B 
misdemeanor, the judge could order you to pay a fine of up to 
$1,850 and also to serve a jail term of up to 180 days. If you are 
charged with a class C misdemeanor, the judge could order you to 
pay a fine of up to $1,387.50 and also to serve a jail term of up 
3 
to 90 days. If you are charged with an infraction, the judge could 
order you to pay a fine of up to $1,387.50. The judge cannot 
impose a jail term if you are charged with an infraction. 
If you are charged with more than one crime, the judge can 
impose consecutive sentences. That means that the judge may impose 
separate jail sentences that do not run at the* same time. The 
judge may order that you serve one jail sentence for one crime, and 
when that jail sentence is finished, you would begin to serve the 
second jail sentence for the second crime and so forth. 
Please also listen carefully to all of the orders that the 
judge gives to you. If, for example, you are ordered to pay a fine 
or complete community service by a certain date, be sure that you 
do it, or a warrant for your arrest will be issued. If you cannot 
follow an order given by the judge, you should discuss the matter 
with your lawyer or you should come back to the court and talk to 
the judge about the problem. Often, extensions for time payment of 
fines and completion of other court orders can be given by the 
judge. 
I have attempted to explain your rights as clearly as I can. 
Your rights are important, and it is important that you understand 
them. If you do not understand them, you may ask the judge about 
them or you may ask the judge to let you talk to your own lawyer or 
with a public defender. 
This will end the tape of the judge's statement of rights. 
Thank you. 
4 
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But my understanding is, although he—Judge Ferrero 
has done many hundred of these things, far more than District 
Court Judges do, they do them all day and it's hard to 
remember any one particular person, he does remember Mr. 
Lucero. 
THE COURT: So, he does have a specific 
recollection? 
MR. DANIELS: Well, let me just say, he has a vague 
specific recollection. 
THE COURT: Very well. 
MR. DANIELS: He can't testify, I don't think, and 
tell you, I remember telling Mr. Lucero X, Y and Z. He'll 
say, I remember Mr. Lucero. And here's what I did with him 
because this is what I always do. He can testify about his 
usual procedure. 
And generally, it's this: He has them sign the 
waiver and then he says to them, now that you've signed these 
things and waived your rights, I need to satisfy my mind that 
you're doing this freely and voluntarily and you understand 
the consequences of it and he goes through those things one by 
one. And of course, that is in the file. 
He goes through the elements of the offense. He 
goes through the possible sentences. He tells them that— 
about each of the rights they're waiving and in this case, in 
particular, one of those rights as you can see, is the right 
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to be represented by counsel. 
Now, there's some—in the petition, there is 
memorandum, she makes—she says it's a little unclear as to 
whether he really has a right or whether he doesn't. I asked 
Judge Ferrero about that and he says, well, in fact, it—the 
way it's stated is exactly correct. That is to say, if a—if-
-you're not always afforded an attorney because you can't 
afford one. I mean, many of us, if we were charged with a 
serious crime probably couldn't afford an attorney. 
THE COURT: Indigency is not an issue in this 
matter. It's right to counsel, and whether or not he 
exercised that right, whether it was afforded or not, either 
indigent or not indigent. To me, indigency is not the central 
issue the Shelton case. 
MR. DANIELS: And I agree with that. 
I—I think that Judge Ferrero would testify that he 
goes through that with him, he helps him understand that he 
does have a right to an attorney, that if he can't afford one, 
one will be appointed. That's in addition to what he's 
already seen on the—on the videotape. 
And then when he is through asking him all those 
questions, if he's satisfied that it's free—done freely and 
voluntarily and knowingly and that he's not under the 
influence of substances or whatever, then he signs the thing 
and that his signature is certification of that. That would 
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be his testimony if he were called as a witness. 
THE COURT: All right. 
Ms. Brereton, do you have any differing opinions as 
to burden of going forward, vis-a-vis burden of proof in this 
matter? 
MS. BRERETON: I do think that by bringing that 
petition, that we have satisfied the burden that we have, that 
we make—we've alleged, or Mr. Lucero's alleged that he did 
not understand and that he was sentenced to jail and was not 
given an attorney. 
THE COURT: But in all—in all respects to this Mr. 
Daniels, this was not a verified petition, was it? 
MS. BRERETON: It was not. 
THE COURT: All right. And so I think there has to 
be something on the record— 
MS. BRERETON: The other— 
THE COURT: —unless you want to just proffer it. 
MS. BRERETON: Well, I would proffer— 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MS. BRERETON: —that defendant did not understand 
and we would make that proffer. I think there's also evidence 
to that in the docket that we have before us and in the record 
because Mr. Lucero, in this case, did on two occasions ask 
that the matter be continued at pre-trial conference, so that 
he could speak with an attorney. There's nothing to indicate 
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"EXHIBIT THREE 
BRIAN E. BROWER, UBN 8486 
MURRAY CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
5025 S. STATE ST. 
P.O. BOX 57520 
MURRAY, UTAH 84157-0520 
TELEPHONE: (801) 264-2642 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
BENJAMIN FRANK LUCERO, 
Petitioner/Defendant 
vs. 
SHERIFF AARON D. KENNARD; CHIEF 
PAUL CUNNINGHAM; SALT LAKE 
COUNTY JAIL; MURRAY CITY 
JUSTICE COURT, 
Respondents/Plaintiff. 
AFFIDAVIT OF MS. KAYLYNN 
OLSEN SUPPORTING MURRAY 
CITY'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
PETITIONER'S REQUEST FOR 
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
Civil Case No. 020907208 
Judge: GLENN K. IWASAKI 
At all times herein mentioned, the affiant, Ms. Kaylynn Olsen, avers the following: 
1. I am one of the two in-court clerks assigned to handle pre-trial and trial calendars 
in the Murray City Municipal Justice Court for Judge P. Gary Ferrero. 
2. That prior to accepting any guilty plea, Judge Ferrero orally advises each 
defendant of their rights, including their right to be represented by an attorney. 
3. That I was the in-court clerk for each of Mr. Benjamin Lucero's pre-trial 
conferences on case number 015003617 in the Murray Municipal Justice Court. 
4. That based on my review of the minute entries made by myself during Mr. 
Lucero's pre-trial conferences, the case was continued on at least two separate occasions 
at the defendant's request so that he could retain an attorney. 
5. That based on my review of the minute entry made by myself at Mr. Lucero's 
hearing on April 29, 2002, as well as my experience observing Judge Ferrero accepting 
thousands of guilty pleas, it is my convincing belief that prior to accepting Mr. Lucero's 
guilty plea, Judge Ferrero orally informed Mr. Lucero of his constitutional rights, 
including his right to be represented by an attorney and that if he could not afford to hire 
his own attorney, that one could be appointed for him free of charge if he qualified based 
on his income. 
6. That based on my review of the minute entry made by myself as well as the 
Justice Court's case file on the aforementioned matter, that Mr. Lucero executed a written 
rights waiver informing him of his right to counsel and expressing his desire to waive that 
right. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s e l l day of IJUULfo O T Q ^ • 
If QvK/nn fncpny Affiant Ms. Kaylyn^Olsen? Affiant 
Murray City Justice Court Clerk 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the 
of the foregoii 
 t  7 $ day of^flft'tfT _ 
ng document, who duly ackno 
2002, Ms. Kaylynn Olsen appeared before me, signer 
wledged to me that^he executed the same. 
TabH 
U i i i . . . . , 
IN THE MUNICIPAL JUSTICE COURT IN AND FOR THE CITY OF MURRAY, 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
CITY OF MURRAY 
vs. 
_L <^ C g , r g 
J ^ Defendant 
DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE 
RIGHTS WAIVER 
Judge: P. Gary Ferrero 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT ENTERING A GUILTY PLEA 
DECLARACIO'N DEL ACUSADO QUE SE DECLARA CULPABLE 
NOTIFICATION OF CHARGES 
NOTIFICACIO'N DE LAS ACUSACIONES 
I have received and read or had read to me a copy of the information which states the crime(s) with which I 
am charged. I understand the charges against me. I have no questions about what I am accused of having done. 
He recibido y he leido o se me ha le'ido una copia del informe el cual describe el(los) delito(s) del(de 
los) cual(es) se me acusa. Entiendo el(los) cargo(s) en mi contra y no tengo pregunta alguna al respecto de lo 
que se me acusa de haber hecho. 
WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
RENUNCIA DE LOS DERECHOS CONSTITUCIONALES 
Under the constitution of Utah and of the United States I have the following right: 
Bajo la constitution del Estado de Utah y de los Estados Unidos, tengo los siguientes derechos: 
1) COUNSEL:. I have the right to consult with and be represented by an attorney. If the 
judge were to determine that I am too poor to be able to hire a lawyer, then the judge could appoint 
one to represent me. I might later, if the judge determined I was able, be required to pay for the 
appointed lawyer's service to me. 
1) ABOGADO: Tengo el derecho de consultar con un abogado y que e'ste me represente. 
Si el juez determinara que no tengo los fondos para contratar un abogado, el juez puede asignar 
uno para que me represente. Puede ser que despue's, si el juez determinara que tenia o tengo las 
posibidades de contratar un abogado, se me requiera pagar por los servicios legales que se me 
proporcionaron. 
2) PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION: Although I can choose to testify if I wish, 
I cannot be forced by anyone to take the witness stand and testify or give evidence against myself. That 
I choose not to testify cannot be held against me in court. 
2) PRIVILEGIO EN CONTRA DEL LA AUTOINCRIMINACION: Aunque puedo escoger 
testificar si lo deseo, nadie me puede forzar a pasar al estrado de los testigos y testificar o dar 
evidencia en mi contra. Mi decision de no testificar, no se puede utilizar en mi contra durante el 
juicio. 
3) CONFRONTATION AND CROSS EXAMINATION OF ACCUSERS: I have a right to see 
and hear in open court the witnesses who give evidence against me. I have, if I represent myself or 
my attorney has, in my behalf, the right to ask questions of those witnesses. I also have the nght to have 
witnesses who will testify in my behalf subpoenaed or, in other words, called to court at government 
expenses. 
3) CONFRONTACIO'N Y CONTRAINTERROGACIO'N DE LOS ACUSADORES: Tengo 
el derecho de ver y de escuchar a ios testigos que presen pruebas en mi contra en una audiencia 
pu'blica. Tengo, si me representara a mi' mismo o si lo hiciera mi abogado, el derecho 
de interrogar a esos testigos. Tambi'en tengo el derecho de que se emplacen a ios testigos para que 
testifiquen a mi favor, o en otras palabras, que se llamen al tribunal a cuenta del gobierno estatal. 
4) JURY TRIAL: I can choose to have a jury hear the case against me. .Any verdict rendered by a 
jury, whether it be guilty or not guilty must be by complete agreement of all jurors. 
4) JUICIO ANTE UN JURADO: Puedo escoger que un jurado escuche el caso en mi contra. 
Cualquiera que sea el veredicto que el jurado dicte, ya sea de culpable o no culpable, tendra' que ser 
por medio de un acuerdo una'nime de todos Ios miembros del jurado. 
5) PRESUMPTION AND PROOF: At trial I am presumed innocent until proven guilty. The burden 
of proving me guilty of the crime(s) charged is upon the prosecutor who must prove each and every 
element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 
5) PRESUNCION Y PRUEBA: En el juicio, se me considera inocente hasta que se 
compruebe mi culpabilidad. El peso de probar mi culpabilidad por el(los) delito(s) que se me 
acusa(n) cae sobre el fiscal, el cual debe probar mas alia' de una duda razonable cada uno y todos 
Ios elementos del(se Ios) delito(s). 
6) APPEAL: If I were to be tried and convicted of the crime(s) with which I am charged. I could 
appeal from any errors of law that may have resulted in my conviction. 
6) ALPELACIO'N: Si se me enjuiciara y condenara por el(los) delito(s) del(de Ios) cual(es) se 
me acusa(n), podr'ia apelar debido a cualquier error de derecho que haya resultado en mi condena. 
I understand each of these constitutional rights. They have been explained to me by the judge or a lawyer. 
I have no question about them. I know that I could plead not guilty and exercise all of the rights listed above. I 
understand that by entering a plea of guilty. I AM GIVING UP THESE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. 
Entiendo cada uno de estos derechos constitucionales. El juez o el abogado me Ios ha explicado y no 
tengo pregunta alguna al respecto. Se' que puedo declararme no culpable y ejercer todos Ios derechos 
mencionados previamente. Entiendo que al declararme culpable, ESTOY RENUNCIANDO A ESTOS 
DERECHOS CONSTITUCIONALES. 
CONSEQUENCES OF ENTERING A GUILTY PLEA 
CONSECUENCIAS DE UNA DELARACION DE CULPABILIDAD 
I am admitting that I did commit the crime(s) to which I plead guilty. I convict myself the same as if I 
were found guilty by a judge or jury. Where more that one crime is mvolved, sentences my be imposed one after 
another, consecutively, or may run at the same time, concurrently. In sentencing me the judge is not required to 
follow what any other person recommends. The judge must impose sentence within the following limits: 
Estoy admitiendo que cometf el(los) delito(s) al(a Ios) cual(es) me estoy declarando culpable. Me 
condeno de la misma manera como si un juez o un jurado me hubiera encontrado culpable. Si existiera ma's 
de un delito, las sentencias se podri'an imponer una seguida de la otra (consecutivamente); o se podri'an 
servir al mismo tiempo (simulta'neamente). No se requiere que el juez siga la recomeudacio'n de otras 
personas en el di'a que se dicte mi pena. El juez debe dictar la pena dentro de ios siguientes if mites: 
OFFENSE 
DELITO 
JAIL 
CARCEL 
FINE 
MULTA 
Class B Misdemeanor 
Class C Misdemeanor 
Infraction 
Delito Menor Clase B 
Delito Menor Clase C 
Infraccion 
0-180 days 
0- 90 days 
0 days 
0-180 dias 
0-90 dias 
0 dias 
$0-51,850.00 
$0-$ 750.00 
$0-$ 750.00 
$0-$1,850.00 
$0-$ 750.00 
$0-$ 750.00 
Certain crimes require added fees or other conditions of sentencing. Some penalties for certain crimes may 
be made greater or enhanced, if there are other convictions for similar crimes. I understand these consequences and 
have no questions about them. 
Ciertos delitos requieren que se les a~nadan multas u otras condiciones a la pena. Algunas penas 
por ciertos delitos, si hubiesen otras condenas por delitos similares, pueden ser mayores o se pueden 
aumentar. Entiendo estas consecuencias y no tengo pregunta alguna al respecto. 
ENTRY OR GUILTY PLEA 
DECLARACIO'N DE CULPABILIDAD 
Of my own choice I enter this plea. No force, promises or threats have been made to get me to do it. I am 
not under the influence of alcohol or drugs or anything that would impair my judgement right now. I have read this 
document or had it read to me. I understand is contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. By signing this 
document I am saying that I ENTER A PLEA OF 
Hago esta declaration por decisio'n propia. No se me ha obligado, prometido, ni amenazado para 
que lo haga. No estoy bajo la influencia del alcohol, drogas o nada que pueda afectar mi sano juicio en este 
momento. He lei do o se me ha lei do este documento. Entiendo el contenido de dicho documento y adopto 
cada declaracio'n como propia. Al firmar este documento, estoy diciendo que ME DECLARO 
GUILTY to: 
CULPABLE DE: DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL/DRUGS, MB 
Names of crime(s) and Class of crime(s) 
Nombre de(de los) delito(s) y Clase del(de los) delito(s) 
Statement of specific comprising elements of each offense and special terms if applicable (plea negotiation, 
no contest plea, etc.): 
Declaracio'n de los elementos especi'ficos por cada delito y arregos especiales si se aplican 
(negociaciones, declaracio'n de no disputar, etc.): 
1. OPERATE OR ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL OF A MOTOR VEHICLE 
2. UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL OR DRUGS 
3- IMPAIRED (.08 OR HIGHER BLOOD ALCOHOL) OR INCAPABLE OF SAFELY 
OPERATING THE VEHICLE 
I further understand that if I am in this country illegally, I am subject to deportation by the Department of 
Immigration and Naturalization Service. Further that if I am an Alien with Legal Resident status my status may be 
revoked and I could be subject to deportation 
Adema's entiendo que si estoy ilegalmente en este pais, estoy sujeto a ser deportado por el 
Departamento de Servicios de Inmigracio'n y Naturalizacio'n. Ademas si soy un extranjero con un estado de 
Residencia Legal, mi estado puede ser revocado y puedo estar suejeto a deportacio'n. 
I further understand that if convicted and deported and I re-enter illegally I am. subject to prosecution in die 
federal courts for illegal re-entry if the conviction was a misdemeanor. If the convictian was for felony or a Class A 
misdemeanor it can be aggravated re-entry. 
Ademas entiendo que si soy condenado por un delito menor y deportado y regreso ilegalmente estoy 
sujeto a ser procesado en los tribunales federales por regresar ilegalmente. Si la condena fue por un delito 
mayor o un delito menor Clase A. Puedo ser enjuiciado por regresar con agravantes 
I UNDERSTAND THAT I HAVE THE RIGHT TO WITHDRAW THIS PLEA WITHIN 30 DAYS OF 
TODAY'S DATE AS LONG AS THE REQUEST IS IN WRITING AND FOR GOOD CAUSE SHOWN. 
ENTIENDO QUE TENGO EL DERECHO DE RETIRAR ESTA DECLARACION DENTRO DE 
UN PLAZO EL DE 30 DIAS DESDE EL DIA DE HOY, CON TAL DE QUE LA PETICION SEA HECHA 
POR ESCRITO Y POR UNA BUENA RAZON. 
Date 
Fecha 
'j^/o £ 
Defendant's Sign^Qre 
Firma del Acusado 
Defendant's Attorney 
Abogado Defe 
Hon. P. 
Judge, Murray Municipal Justice Court 
Juez 
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Heather Brereton (8151) 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
AUG 8 - 2002 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
Benjamin Frank Lucero, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
Sheriff Aaron D. Kennard; 
Chief Paul Cunningham; Salt 
Lake County Jail; Murray City 
Justice Court, 
Respondents. 
AFFIDAVIT OF IMPECUNIOSITY 
Case No. Q^Q^O 1 0^°$ 
Judge: J inx? <?a JU 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF 
:ss 
) 
I, Benjamin Frank Lucero, do solemnly swear that owing to my poverty I am 
unable to bear the expenses of the action or legal proceedings which I am about to 
commence (or the appeal which I am about to take), and that I verily believe I am justly 
entitled to the relief sought by such action, legal proceedings or appeal. 
(a) I, Benjamin Frank Lucero, am a resident of S L C o and incarcerated at 
the Salt Lake County Jail, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
(b) My amount of income, including government financial support, alimony, 
child support is $ O per month. 
(c) Assets owned, including real and personal property 
(e) Accounts receivable: 
£ 
(f) Securities, checking and savings account 
balances: <2> 
(g) Debts: ^ * ^ ; I <* « ,A 5 3 r<9d) * ~ 
(h) Monthly 
expenses: 'Zoo*'* 
DATED this ~^ ( day of Q o ( y 2002. 
AND SWORN TO before me this*3{ day of %\)\\v 2002 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
s 
STATE OF j)TAH I 
§*% 
&^%\ Patricia A. Rodman K x \ f l M . \ 0 U . \ . A-SQtxPTM 
£ V ° « r $ / i / 5' LrKe C"y' U,ah 84,°2 \<^y*J y Commission Expires Residing at: 
Heather Brereton (8151) 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
m£H9.0mmi COURT 
Third Judicial District 
AUG 3 - 2002 
//' /SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
Benjamin Frank Lucero, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
Sheriff Aaron D. Kennard; 
Chief Paul Cunningham: Salt Lake 
County Jail; Murray City Justice 
Court, 
Respondents. 
APPLICATION TO PROCEED 
IN FORMA PAUPERIS, SUPPORTING 
DOCUMENTATION AND ORDER 
Case No. O^OJO 7^? 
Judge: J T ^ A S S £ / 
I, Benjamin Frank Lucero, declare according to Utah Code Ann. § 21-7-3 that I am the plaintiff in the above-
entitled proceeding; that, in support of my request to proceed without being required to prepay fees, cost or give 
security therefor, I state that because of my poverty, I am unable to pay the costs of said proceeding or give security 
therefor; that I believe I am entitled to relief. The nature of my action is briefly stated as follows: That I am 
entitled to relief under Rule 65C since the conviction or sentence in my criminal case was imposed in violation 
of the state and federal constitutions. 
As required by state law, I hereby answer the following questions: 
I. Are you presently employed? (If an inmate, are you employed in an inmate program or work release 
program) Yes • No 
a. If the answer is "yes", state the amount of your salary or wages per month, and give the name 
and address of your employer (list both gross and net salary): 
b. If the answer is "no", state the date of last employment and the amount of the salary and wages 
per month which you received: /K $ 2 - 30 O f*±<r i\o^ + 
H L 
2. Are you representing yourself in this lawsuit? T?.fr...? Yes Q-"" No • 
3. Have you received within the past twelve months any money from any of the following sources? . 
a. Business, profession or other form of self-employment? Yes • No ^^y/ 
b. Rent payments, interest or dividends? Yes n No 0 ^ \ 
c. Pension, annuities or life insurance payments? Yes • NoJ* 
d. Gifts or inheritance?, Yes • No 0 / / 
If the answer to any of the above is "yes," describe each source of money and state the amount received 
from each during the past twelve months: 
4. Do you own any cash, or do you have money in checking or savings account? (Include any funds in 
prison accounts.) Yes a N O G 
If the answer is "yes", state current balance $ 
5. Do you own or have any interest in any real estate, stocks, bonds, notes^aiUornobiles>or other 
property of value? Yes Q^~~ No • 
If the answer is "yes," describe the property, specify its location, and state its approximate value: 
6. List persons who are dependent upon you for financial support, state your relationship to those persons, 
and indicate how much you contribute toward their support: 
7. Are you receiving alimony? Yes • No 0^ 
If "yes", how much per month? $ 
8. Annual untaxed income and benefits: 
a. Social security benefits $ _ _ 0 
b. Aid to Families with Dependant Children (AFDC or ADC) $ 0 
c. Child Support $ (2> 
d. Welfare Benefits $ ® 
e. Worker's Compensation $ 0 
f. Veterans noneducational benefits such as Death Pension, Dependency, and Indemnity 
Compensation $ $ 
g. Housing, food, and other living allowances paid to members of the military, clergy, and 
others $ 0 
Total $ $ 
9. Are you receiving funds or money from any other sources? Yes • No 
if the answer is "yes", please list: 
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing information is true and correct 
Executed on *7/S/(&2r 
(date)
 r—-/Signature of Appflicaot) 
, , ' ; - ; ; ' . .^ .WJAWY P U B L I C 
A . i ^ ' X \ P?tr:cte A. Rodman 
I '- / '&*• :'' X{ \ " J 4 CdSt 50 r ) South #300 
\M (, ^ . j ' • / Sa.t Lake City, Utah 84102 
I \LK'* J ^ / v M y Commission Expires 
eari^^^-y June? -xsn* ( s i a f ^ V ™ ^ J u n e 2 2 0 0 5 i v — ^ STATE OF UTAH 
Notary Public 
My Commission Expires: 
